The Ethics of Advocacy for the Mentally Ill: Philosophic and Ethnographic Considerations by Arrigo, Bruce A. & Williams, Christopher R.
The Ethics of Advocacy for the Mentally Ill:
Philosophic and Ethnographic Considerations
Bruce A. Arrigo* and Christopher R. Williams**
I. INTRODUCTION: ON THE NOTION OF JUSTICE AND
ETHICS IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY'
The field of law and psychology emerged in the late 1960s with
an avowed commitment to justice.' This emphasis on justice
was a deliberate attempt to make the forensic domain "relevant"
by ',challeng[ing] and transform[ing] a prevailing 'judicial com-
mon sense' that had been used to keep the disenfranchised down
so long". The medicolegal4 field, with its identified "ultimate
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1. Portions of this introductory section are taken from Bruce A. Arrigo, Back to the Future:
The Place of Justice in Forensic Psychological Research and Practice, 1 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL.
PRAC. 1-7 (2001) (original citations omitted).
2. See Dennis Fox, Psychology and Law: Justice Diverted, in CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 217,
217-18 (Dennis Fox & Isaac Prilleltensky eds., 1997) [hereinafter Fox, Psychology and Law];
Dennis R. Fox, Psycholegal Scholarship's Contribution to False Consciousness About Injustice,
23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 9, 9-10 (1999) [hereinafter Fox, False Consciousness]; Craig Haney,
Psychology and Legal Change: The Impact of a Decade, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 371, 375
(1993); Gary B. Melton, Realism in Psychology and Humanism in Law: Psycholegal Studies at
Nebraska, 69 NEB. L. REV. 251, 259 (1990).
3. Haney, supra note 2, at 375. Tapp and Levine state:
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purpose" [o]f promot[ing] justice and assess[ing] the role of law
in achieving a just social order"5 was institutionalized with the
1968 founding of the American Psychology-Law Society
(APLS).6 Unfortunately for the early pioneers of the APLS
movement, the centrality of justice in psycholegal research
mostly remain[s] diverted.'
Today, in far too many research settings, psycholegal scholar-
ship focuses on a limited and narrowly construed collection of
topics. 8 [For example,] jury behavior, eyewitness testimony, sex
The explosion of law has done more than promote justice. It has clarified that the law
is a mobility belt not solely for the "rights-deprived" but also for the "relevance-
deprived." Psychologists had begun to experience frustration, futility, and doubt in
the late 1960's and early 1970's, a period of insecurity for both science and society....
As a result some psychologists chose to act on or in the most potent "rule" or "norm"
institution in the social structure-the law.
June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine, Epilogue for Psychology and Law, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND
THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 363, 363 (June Louin
Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds., 1977).
We note further that this concern for justice, as developed in the law-psychology domain,
parallels the genesis of critical criminology. For a detailed analysis of critical criminology in
relation to social justice, see SOCIAL JUSTICE/CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE MATURATION OF
CRITICAL THEORY IN LAW, CRIME, AND DEVIANCE (Bruce A. Arrigo ed., 1999). To date, as
best as we can discern, no systematic assessment on the relationship between these two move-
ments has thus far been undertaken. A number of striking similarities are discernible as
evidenced by this Article's thesis and exposition.
4. Throughout this Article, the word "clinicolegal" is used interchangeably with "medico-
legal." These descriptors refer to the joint and overlapping effects of the psychiatric and legal
communities, as well as the mental health and justice systems. See Bruce A. Arrigo, Civil Con-
finement, Semiotics and Discourse on Difference: An Historical Critique of the Sign of Paternalism,
in FLUX, COMPLEXITY, AND ILLUSION 23 n.6 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1993). These effects
often include the exercise of "expert" decision-making impacting the lives of disordered citizens.
See id.
5. June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine, Reflections and Redirections, in LAW, JUSTICE,
AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 3, 5 (June Louin
Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds., 1977).
6. Fox, False Consciousness, supra note 2, at 9-10.
7. See Fox, Psychology and Law, supra note 2, at 218-19. Critics of mainstream psycholegal
scholarship assert that despite contributions from critical legal studies, feminist jurisprudence,
postmodern inquiry, and the like, scant attention has been given to "law's potential downside
even as [forensic researchers] examined discretionary factors in legal decision-making and pro-
posed relatively minor institutional reforms." Fox, False Consciousness, supra note 2, at 10.
Other commentators suggest that the law-psychology field remains constituted by practitioners
who "still have blinders on when they look at the law and the legal system." Gary B. Melton,
President's Column, 11 AM. PSYCHOL.-L. SOC'Y NEWS 1, 1 (1991). These are blinders that
signal "an abandoning of a sense of mission-the mission of legal change." Haney, supra note 2,
at 378-79.
8. See, e.g., Mark A. Small, Legal Psychology and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 37 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 675, 687 (1993); James R.P. Ogloff, Introduction, in LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: THE
BROADENING OF THE DISCIPLINE 1, 2 (1992); D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer, HANDBOOK OF
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offender treatment, and expert witness studies[,] while certainly
interesting... , seldom, if ever, explore prospects for broad-
based social or political change,9 or examine opportunities for
advancing the interests of citizen rights and/or collective jus-
tice."° Despite these shortcomings, the forensic field is, at its
core, about justice." This means that questions concerning
psycholegal practices, and the manner in which people are
socially, politically, economically, and philosophically affected
by them require careful and considerable scrutiny. 2
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW at xi (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds., 1992); Michael J. Saks, The
Law Does Not Live by Eyewitness Testimony Alone, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 279, 279 (1986);
Ronald Roesch, Creating Change in the Legal System: Contributions from Community Psychology,
19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 325, 328-29 (1995); Richard L. Weiner, Introduction: Law and
Psychology-Beyond Mental Health and Legal Procedure, 37 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 499, 499-500
(1993). For example, Dennis Fox contends that, with an emphasis on justice, the law-
psychology field has rarely posed several relevant questions regarding the human condition and
human social behavior previously ignored or dismissed by the discipline. Fox, False Conscious-
ness, supra note 2, at 10. He ponders:
How does the law ensure the maintenance of societal inequality and power imbal-
ances? When does law provide the appearance of justice without the reality? Does
the lack of consensus about how to define justice mean we cannot attack injustice? To
what extent does reliance on law deflect attention from other solutions to societal
problems?
Id.
9. See Dennis R. Fox, Psychological Jurisprudence and Radical Social Change, 48 AM. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 234, 234 (1993).
10. Gary B. Melton, The Significance of Law in the Everyday Lives of Children and Families,
22 GA. L. REV. 851, 851-52. See also Gary B. Melton, The Law Is a Good Thing (Psychology Is,
Too): Human Rights in Psychological Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 395 (1992).
Contributions from the therapeutic jurisprudence literature notwithstanding, some argue that
these efforts largely assess how the state can function as a powerful instrument of control, coer-
cion, and regulation in which psychology merely operates as the handmaiden of legal decision-
making. Fox, Psychology and Law, supra note 2, at 218-19. But see NORMAN J. FINKEL,
COMMONSENSE JUSTICE (1995) (discussing jury nullification). For examples of therapeutic
jurisprudence literature see, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEU-
TIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996); BRUCE J. WINICK,
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED (1997); Michael M. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or
Path to Redemption? 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 80 (1995); Bruce A. Arrigo & Jeffrey J.
Tasca, Right to Refuse Treatment, Competency to Be Executed, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
Toward a Systematic Analysis, 23 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (1999).
11. See BRUCE A. ARRIGO, INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY at xvi (2000).
12. See id. There is something approximating a tradition of this sort within mental health
law circles dating back, at least, to the antipsychiatry movement of the 1960s. Indeed, on the
American front, Szasz's and Ennis' investigations of insanity and jurisprudence, see BRUCE J.
ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1972); THOMAS S. SZAZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHI-
ATRY (1963); THOMAS SZASZ, INSANITY (1987) [hereinafter SZAZ, INSANITY]; Morse's analysis
of "crazy behavior," morals, science, and liberty, see Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals,
and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978); Stephen J.
Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally
Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REV. 54 (1982); Stephen J. Morse, Treating Crazy People Less Specially,
90 W. VA. L. REV. 353 (1988); Isaac's and Armat's review of law and psychiatry's abandonment
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One domain where law-psychology-justice research has yet to
assess forensic intervention entails the ethics of advocacy for the men-
tally ill. Broadly speaking, the concept of "ethics" has increasingly
assumed a more passive, perhaps trivialized, role within the various
academic fields where it was recognized as a valuable dimension and a
necessary condition for ensuring the humanity of people. 3 This is
most troubling in the law-psychology domain. 14 To be clear, our rele-
gation of ethics to its more pedagogical and sanitary status forfeits its
very foundations; that is, it undercuts the significance of moral con-
templation and the importance of justice in human social interaction.
Modern science teaches us to understand the ethical sphere within the
imposed, coercive confines of its jurisdiction." That is to say, ethics is
"built" upon an edifice, a structure of abstractions resting solely on the
intangible underpinnings upon which it is posed. 6 What is "selected
out" as defining ethical boundaries is that which can be reduced to the
abstract.17
In the fourteenth century, William of Ockham proposed an
economic principle that has indirectly come to influence the fabric of
of the mentally ill, see RAEL JEAN ISSAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS
(1990); and Arrigo's critique of civil and criminal confinement law for the psychiatrically disor-
dered, see BRUCE A. ARRIGO, MADNESS, LANGUAGE, AND THE LAW (1993) [hereinafter
ARRIGO, MADNESS]; BRUCE A. ARRIGO, THE CONTOURS OF PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE (1996)
[hereinafter ARRIGO, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE]; are all exemplars of this perspective. For the
radical/critical psychology movement more generally see CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 2;
ISAAC PRILLELTENSKY, THE MORALS AND POLITICS OF PSYCHOLOGY (1994).
13. In his review of how the journal Law and Human Behavior has addressed issues
concerning law and psychology, Ogloff notes that in order for legal psychology to advance
knowledge, researchers "must develop an understanding of 'why' some phenomen[a] in law exist.
Thus, it is not enough to know what types of pretrial publicity affect jurors, for example, but why
they react the way they do and how the media affects their decision-making .... [O]nce we
understand the cause of phenomen[a], we can begin to learn how the law can be revised, when
necessary, to better reflect the reality of human behavior." James R.P. Ogloff, Law and Human
Behavior: Reflecting Back and Looking Forward, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 1, 3-4 (1999).
Applying this to ethics, researchers must develop an understanding of why ethics in law exists.
See id. If we understand this, then we can learn how the law of ethics can be revised to better
reflect the reality of human behavior. See id.
14. For application of this phenomenon to the interest-balancing of mental health con-
sumer rights see, ARRIGO, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 78-79, 179-80.
15. See Bruce A. Arrigo, New Directions in Crime, Law, and Social Change: On Psycho-
analytic Semiotics, Chaos Theory, and Postmodern Ethics, 33 W. GA. C. STUD. SOC. SCI. 115
(1995).
16. See ROLLO MAY, THE DISCOVERY OF BEING 52 (1983).
17. Id. Ethics in the law-psychology domain attempts to fit critical cases into abstract prin-
ciples (e.g., the duty to warn vs. client confidentiality, mandated conditions for reporting child
sexual abuse, the ethics of advocacy by psychologists). The dilemma, of course, is that many of
the nuances, complexities, and differences among the cases constituting real, unpredictable life
are concealed and reduced to how such subtleties satisfy an artificial, and often homogenous,
notion of personal and civic conduct.
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our ethical edifice. Ockham's Razor states that "entities are not to be
multiplied beyond necessity. "18 In other words, what is simplest is
best. Thus, an abstract rule becomes a rule because it is simple to fol-
low-to obey. And, equally, our identification of those whose behavior
conflicts with or otherwise transgresses our rules becomes less ambig-
uous and less subject to debate. Indeed, codification of rules intends
absence of ambiguity and of individual decision-making. 9 Decisions
are, instead, produced by a representative democracy-the select few
who, by way of "expert" knowledge, are deemed competent and are
bestowed the power to speak for (presumably on behalf of) other con-
stituencies. Again, as we will argue below, this is particularly disturb-
ing in the domain of psychology and law, where mental health systems
users are routinely subjected to the expertise of clinicolegal decision
brokers,2" such as judges and psychiatrists, whose choices all too
frequently activate transcarcerative2" ends.
Those phenomena that are easily subjected to "degrees of control
and analysis necessary for the formulation of abstract laws"2 are codi-
fied in such a way as to demand control.23 What is more amenable to
the formulation of abstract laws than laws (or rules) themselves?
24
Such is the constitution of ethical codes. Many systems-including the
mental health and legal apparatuses-have been constructed (codified)
18. Philotheus Boehner, Introduction to OCKHAM, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS at ix, xxi
(Philotheus Boehner ed. & trans., 1957).
19. Generally speaking, the notion that one's thoughts or a group's sentiments can eventu-
ally be penned presumes that there is some consensus on the form and content of one's convic-
tions. In law, we describe this consensus in terms of "plain meaning" or "clear intent," with the
belief that such decision-making functions much like a "science"-a legal science. See Harvard
Celebration Speeches, 3 LAW Q. REV. 124 (1887) (Professor Langdell discussing law as a science).
For a critical analysis of this approach from the realist and sociological jurisprudence tradition to
legal semiotics and postmodern law see DRAGAN MILOVANOVIC, A PRIMER IN THE SOCIOL-
OGY OF LAW, pt. II, at 84 (2d. 1994).
20. Arrigo, supra note 4, at 23.
21. Transcarceration is the "repeated channeling of disordered defendants (subjects)
through institutional regimes of discipline and coercion." Bruce A. Arrigo, Transcarceration:
Notes on a Psychoanalytically-Informed Theory of Social Practice in the Criminal Justice and Mental
Health Systems, 27 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 31, 31 (1997). In the extreme (and in some cases
notwithstanding the best of advocacy intentions), persons with psychiatric disorders become
prisoners of confinement, meaning that they are repeatedly routed to and from the civil and
criminal systems of institutional control (i.e., transcarcerated) with little opportunity to break
free from this disciplinary cycle. See id. at 32; ENNIS, supra note 12, at 215-16.
22. KENNETH W. SPENCE, BEHAVIOR THEORY AND CONDITIONING 236 (1956).
23. DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 6-7 (1976).
24. Pound described this social control process in law as one that required the power "to
influence the behavior of men through the pressure of their fellow men." ROSCOE POUND,
SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 49 (Archon Books 1968) (1942). For a sociolegal analysis
of the social control perspective in law see ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY
40(1993).
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in terms of abstract laws that collectively comprise an intimidating
structure, turning volitional subjects into impugned objects who suc-
cumb to the will of the code in unreflective, subjugated obedience.25
Indeed, what person or group could, without fear of legal reprisal or
sanctioned repercussion, brave the turbulent waters of defiance and
resistance-that is, embrace individual reason without (potentially)
forfeiting something meaningful in the process? We seek such an edi-
fying structure in our impetuous escape from the anxiety of personal
choice and responsibility. Rollo May refers to this as the "edifice
complex."2 6 The "escape" is treated at length by Fromm in his work
Escape from Freedom.27
What all this suggests is that we, as constituent practitioners
and/or scholars in the world of humanism and of human rights, have
acquiesced to an unreflective existence within the preconfigured
borders of (ethical) codes laid before us by our ancestors.2" This
legacy does not imply that we, as individuals, necessarily have made a
choice to escape from the freedom of responsibility. What it does, in
fact, suggest is that we no longer enjoy the power to make such a
choice. At some historical point, the representative powers that be
concluded that it was in our best interest to be subjected to constraints
on moral discretion. One can only assume that our predecessors were
unable to find the possibility of such unbridled freedom liberating.
Perhaps a select few made choices that were not in the best interests of
their clients and/or communities; consequently, such decision-making
power was withdrawn from their/our possession. The result, of
25. See Bruce A. Arrigo, Desire in the Psychiatric Courtroom: On Lacan and the Dialectics of
Linguistic Oppression, 16 CURRENT PERSP. SOC. THEORY 159, 160-61 (1996); Bruce A. Arrigo,
Toward a Theory of Punishment in the Psychiatric Courtroom: On Language, Law and Lacan, 19 J.
CRIME & JUST. 15, 16 (1996). Consider, for example, the manner in which the administrative
hearing unfolds in which a determination is made about prospects for sustained institutional con-
fmement for a psychiatrically disordered petitioner. Resistance to the established code of com-
portment or opposition to the "ethic" of clinicolegal communication (i.e., appropriate speech,
thought, and behavior) can thwart any expectation of release from civil or criminal custody. See
generally ARRIGO, MADNESS, supra note 12, at 135-40 (1993) (discussing how the law defines
what is normal, based on the majority, which disadvantages the mentally ill because they do not
fit into the norm).
26. MAY, supra note 16, at 52.
27. ERICH FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM (1941).
28. This willing abdication or obedient acquiescence, absent prudent speculation, is
precisely what we draw attention to in this Article. Both critical legal and critical psychological
inquiry necessitate that we examine more systematically the implicit assumptions and hidden
values embedded in the choices that we make. The need for such careful discernment is particu-
larly warranted when assessing the advocacy efforts undertaken on behalf of citizens with psychi-
atric disorders. For a more detailed philosophical investigation of the values at issue when
advocating for mental health system users see Christopher R. Williams & Bruce A. Arrigo, The
Philosophy of the Gift and the Ethics of Advocacy: Critical Reflections on Forensic Mental Health
Intervention, 13 INT'LJ. SEMIOTICS L. 215 (2000).
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course, continues to be a circumscribed education in morality and
justice.
To be sure, many of us regard ethics as the study of rules or
codes of conduct that define professional choice and responsibility.
29
Regardless of how one may feel about the presence of such rules, we
have, undoubtedly, lost touch with what ethics really is. We no longer
deliberately regard ethics as that which embodies concepts such as
good, right, virtue, freedom, choice, and the morality that constitutes
an ethical mode of being. Perhaps we are aware that ethical rules or
codes are presumably assembled upon such conceptual underpinnings,
yet we frequently take this for granted: the recipe that has become
ethics is merely "taught" to us. As a consequence, students and prac-
titioners memorize selected ethical precepts that apply to their poten-
tial or actual areas of practice. What we often neglect, however, are
the critical and philosophical bases upon which such rules are formed.
In other words, there is a certain morality and a particular sense of
justice that encompasses every rule that we are taught or, perhaps, are
teaching. On too many occasions, we unreflectively abandon the theo-
retical (and ideological) explorations that must necessarily accompany
such instruction.3 °
In its relationship to morality and justice, we contend that ethics
is not something that should be taught. Rather, it is something that
should be explored, something one comes to understand on one's own
terms. As Schopenhauer duly noted:
As the biggest library if it is in disorder is not as useful as a
small but well-arranged one, so you may accumulate a vast
amount of knowledge but it will be of far less value to you than a
much smaller amount if you thought it over for yourself .... 3
When we experience knowledge-a knowledge that one must
come to personally-only then can our decisions or choices be regarded
as truly ethical. The distinction between the human being and the
29. For example, see DONALD N. BERSOFF, ETHICAL CONFLICTS IN PSYCHOLOGY 1
(1995).
30. As one of five traditional branches of philosophy, the ethics we have in mind is a blend
of both metaethics (the study of the meaning of ethical concepts) and normative or applied ethics
(the study of specific ethical theories in relation to specific behaviors engaged in by individuals
under particular conditions or circumstances, mindful of "professional" boundaries. JOYCELYN
M. POLLOCK, ETHICS IN CRIME AND JUSTICE: DILEMMA AND DECISIONS 4-5 (2d ed. 1994).
The metaethical principles we consider include ethical egoism, altruism, the "good" act, etc.
The application of these principles is linked to advocacy efforts for persons with mental disor-
ders, subject to civil confinement or other forms of institutionalization. See, e.g., Williams &
Arrigo, supra note 28.
31. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, ESSAYS AND APHORISMS 89 (R.J. Hollingdale trans.,
1970).
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automaton posing as human is found within this process of reflection
and exploration.
Our intention in the present Article is to explore the various
paths that influence the often unquestioned choices we are impelled by
rule/law to make, and those we may, at times, ponder. An exploration
of ethics necessarily encourages us to understand why we make the
choices that we do. From our perspective, a choice that is based
merely on custom, convention, rule, etc., is not an ethical choice at all.
And, without choice, the humanity we claim to hold so dear in our
professional pursuits not only disappears, it becomes nonexistent.
In this Article, we critically address several philosophical under-
pinnings of ethical decision-making that impact persons with psychi-
atric disorders. We focus our attention, however, upon an admittedly
limited target area. Thus, we canvass a select number of significant
issues that pose unique problems for humanity. The purpose of these
excursions is that of reflection. In brief, we will speculatively examine:
(1) the relationship between human rights and the law; (2) the rela-
tionship between mental illness and the law (i.e. the rights of the men-
tally ill); (3) the ethics of involuntary confinement (i.e., taking away
and giving back rights to the mentally ill); (4) the ethics of advocating
for the rights of the mentally ill; 32 and (5) the philosophical limits of
ethical (mental health) advocacy.
Our conceptually animated comments will then be applied to
several case studies where questions of advocacy uniquely impact the
lives of different psychiatric citizens. While our remarks in this
section can only be construed as provisional, the findings will disclose
just how ethically vexing the notion of forensic advocacy for persons
with mental disorders is. We will conclude by assessing the implica-
tions of our philosophic and ethnographic exploration for purposes of
mental health law, psychological humanism, and critical inquiry.
II. "HUMAN" RIGHTS AND THE LAW
In order to examine systematically the relationship between law-
psychology-justice and forensic advocacy, the more general connection
between the function of law and individual rights must be delineated.33
32. We are mindful of the violence research (e.g., the MacArthur Studies) documenting
how persons with severe and untreated mental illness are more dangerous than members of the
general population, especially when the mentally ill suffer from command hallucinations and co-
occurring substance use disorders. John Monahan, Violence Prediction: The Past Twenty Years
and the Next Twenty Years, 23 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 107 (1996). Our thesis, however,
addresses the general condition in which advocacy and rights-claiming for the mentally ill take
place.
33. By "function of law" we refer to how the law behaves; that is, the patterns of judicial
[Vol. 24:245
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In short, as citizens of a larger society we are dependent upon the law
for the rights we possess as human beings. Law codifies and pro-
claims those rights that attach to us as individuals, given our status as
citizens."4 The use of the word "possess" is intentional. It implies
something that is always temporary; that is, something that can be
taken away.35 Further, it implies the presence of some definable,
delimited "object" that an individual currently enjoys as her or his
own. The word "right" itself has come to mean something that is
given (as in a gift)36 and, consequently, something that can just as read-
ily and easily be taken away.37 Thus, a right is certainly not a free-
decision-making, legal thought, or statutory construction that constitute a system of predictable
behavior, yielding social control. See BLACK, supra note 23, at 2; DONALD BLACK, SOCIOLOG-
ICAL JUSTICE 8 (1989).
34. See, e.g., MILOVANOVIC, supra note 19. Critical sociolegal commentators (e.g., decon-
structionists, critical race theorists, postmodernists, constitutive integrationists) have been espe-
cially persuasive along these lines, demonstrating how words, whether spoken or written, make
possible one's identity, agency, being, and humanity. For a deconstructionist analysis see J.M.
Balkin, Deconstructive Practices and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987); DRUCILLA COR-
NELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1999) (1991). For
a critical race theory analysis see RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES (1995).
For a postmodernist analysis see JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH (1997); DRAGAN
MILOVANOVIC, POSTMODERN CRIMINOLOGY (1997). For a constitutive integrationist
analysis see STUART HENRY & DRAGAN MILOVANOVIC, CONSTITUTIVE CRIMINOLOGY
(1996); CONSTITUTIVE CRIMINOLOGY AT WORK (Stuart Henry & Dragan Milovanovic eds.,
1999).
35. The function of law is not principally to invest in rules and procedures; rather, to
ensure "governmental social control." BLACK, supra note 23, at 2. Law, then, operates as a"quantitative variable." Id. at 3. In other words, as Milovanovic observes, "law is measured in
terms of how much mobilization of social control takes place in a particular instance." MILO-
VANOVIC, supra note 19, at 20. Black measures this legal mobilization by "the number and
scope of prohibitions, obligations, and other standards to which people are subject, and by the
rate of legislation, litigation, and adjudication [that correspondingly occurs]." BLACK, supra note
23, at 3. Thus, one's possession of rights is temporary, depending on the quantifiable mobiliza-
tion of the law and legal actions, procedures, and processes that ensue.
36. See, e.g., Bruce A. Arrigo & Christopher R. Williams, The (Im)possibility of Democratic
Justice and the 'Gift' of the Majority: On Derrida, Deconstruction, and the Search for Equality, 16
J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 321, 323-26 (2000). The right to representation can also be
understood as a gift assigned to persons unable to speak on their own behalf. For more on the
philosophy of the gift see THE LOGIC OF THE GIFT (Alan D. Schrift ed., 1997). For an analysis
of rights for individuals with psychiatric disorders see ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S.
RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES (1996). For an integra-
tion of the logic of the gift of rights and the psychology of advocacy see Williams & Arrigo, supra
note 28.
37. This is a reference to Derrida's deconstructionist notion on the (im)possibility of the
gift (as a right) and, by extension, the (im)possibility of advocacy for mental health systems
users. According to Derrida, in order for a gift to occur it must not be caught in the logic of gift-
exchange. That is to say, the economy of reciprocity, of reappropriation, un-does the gift qua
gift. Therefore, the value of any gift (material or nonmaterial in nature) must not be derived
from its status as an object of exchange, lest the unadulterated virtue of the award (i.e., right) be
destroyed. See JACQUES DERRIDA, GIVEN TIME 12-15 (Peggy Kamuf. trans., 1992) (1991);
JOHN D. CAPUTO, DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL 18-19 (John D. Caputo ed., 1997).
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dom: there is always a certain boundary imposed upon one's right;
that is, a limit to one's freedom. In other words, one does not have the
freedom to do what one pleases with her or his right. One's right is
defined, as are its margins, by an exogenous, legally demarcated
morality into which one has no direct input.s8
In this sense, rights are something that we are given by the law.
Without the law, one has no rights, per se or a priori. One must look
to (i.e. rely upon) the law for the very rights that allow us to be
human, to behave as human beings. 9  One may ask: "Do we not
enjoy certain rights merely by being human; that is, by being alive in
this world?" To answer this query, one need only ask: "Are there
rights that cannot be taken away?"4  The answer is clearly no. In
other words, the extent to which our rights can be taken from us when,
for example, we abuse or misuse them, is the degree to which they are
always rights provided to us by the law.
The contours of this debate were extensively investigated by 18th
century French Enlightenment thinkers, including Charles-Louis
Montesquieu, Francois Voltaire, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau among
others.4 The Enlightenment thinkers were active in protesting the
essential lack of rights that the majority enjoyed. They argued for
For applications to mental health advocacy see Williams & Arrigo, supra note 28.
38. Another way to state this is that the law "hails" or "interpellates" the subject. For a
discussion of "interpellation" see Louis ALTHUSSER, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER
ESSAYS 170-86 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971). As Hunt observes:
law constitutes or participates in the constitution of a terrain or field within which
social relations are generated, reproduced, disputed and struggled over, the most
important implication being that within such a field.., the legal discourses in play
both place limits of possibility on social action and impose specific forms of discursive
possibility.
HUNT, supra note 24, at 293.
39. See, e.g., MILOVANOVIC, supra note 19. The rights of the mentally ill are one case in
point. Although this constituency enjoys the right to treatment, the right to treatment refusal,
the right to counsel, etc., questions persist about how these rights attach and the instrumental
role the law assumes in securing, sustaining, legitimizing, or taking away such protections. For
further discussion, see Christopher R. Williams, Inside the Outside and Outside the Inside: Nega-
tive Fusion from the Margins of Humanity, 23 HUMAN. & SOc'Y 70 (1999); Bruce A. Arrigo &
Christopher R. Williams, Chaos Theory and the Social Control Thesis: A Post-Foucauldien Analy-
sis of Mental Illness and Involuntary Civil Confinement, 26 SOC. JUST. 177 (1999); Arrigo &
Williams, supra note 36; Williams & Arrigo, supra note 28.
40. Even constitutional scholars debate "the erosion" of liberty rights, fearing that these
rights will, in certain contexts or under particular conditions, be eliminated altogether. See, e.g.,
DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER (3d ed. 1993); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
41. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (Anne M. Cohler, et al. eds. & trans., 1989)
(1740); JEAN JAQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES (G.D.H. Cole
trans., 1950) (1762); VOLTAIRE, LETTERS ON ENGLAND (Leonard Tancock trans., 1980)




"natural rights"; that is, rights that all human beings were entitled to
simply by being human.42 Thus, they advocated, among other things,
for the abolition of slavery43 and for more humane treatment of crimi-
nals and other "objectionable" persons.44  These same "human
rights," as we have discussed, are the rights that often conflict with
law. It is the law which, metaphorically speaking, "strips" individuals
of their natural rights at birth, only to subsequently give rights back to
individuals in the form of legislatively defined privileges and protec-
tions (i.e. "gifts"). As Rousseau suggested, these rights were mere
frauds, instruments of the powerful established as a means of main-
taining their chosen way of life by deception.45 We will return to this
point later when discussing the parens patriae and police powers of the
state in relation to the mentally ill. For now, however, we conclude by
stating this section's thesis: human beings engage in a parasitic rela-
tionship with the law. Further, the law is that which gives and takes
away rights; it is the edifice to which we must turn to ensure that our
rights are protected and sustained.
III. THE MENTALLY ILL, RIGHTS, AND THE LAW
The mentally ill, as one citizen group in contemporary society,
find that they are in an even more precarious position than the general
population. Not only are they, similar to all other human beings,
living under the rights provided to them by the law, but they also con-
stitute a membership group that has had many of their (given) rights
taken from them.46 Thus, not only must they look to the law to up-
hold their rights as human beings (i.e. human rights), they must
contest the law to reestablish those rights (i.e., given rights) that are
appropriated from them.47 In this sense, then, the mentally ill become
twice-removed from a state of true human existence. Of course, one
of the key dilemmas in this situation is that many mentally ill persons
are not regarded as competent enough to represent themselves.4" In
42. For example, see MONTESQUIEU, supra note 41, at 6-7.
43. ROSSEAU, supra note 41, at 7-12; MONTESQUIEU, supra note 41, at 246.
44. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 41, at 89-93.
45. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 41, at 41.
46. See LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 36, at 1-8. See also e.g., RAEL JEAN ISAAC &
VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS (1990); JOHN Q. LAFOND & MARY L.
DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM (1992); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW
(1999).
47. See LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 36, at 7-8.
48. See Fernando J. Gutierrez, Who Is Watching Big Brother When Big Brother Is Watching
Mental Health Professionals: A Call for the Evaluation of Mental Health Advocacy Programs, 20
LAW & PSYCH. REV. 57, 95 (1996).
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cases such as these, advocates are appointed to help champion the
causes of mentally ill persons, or even to fight for them. 9
The unique position of persons with mental illness, however, is
one that is historically contingent. Indeed, their position with regard
to rights and the law has changed over time." While many would
agree that the status of psychiatric citizens in society (particularly their
treatment and legitimacy as human beings) has substantially improved
over the course of history, this "progress" has not been without its
impediments. 1 Similar to Nietzsche, we must question our premature
celebration of a Darwinian definition of progress and the devolution of
humanity that often accompanies such growth. 2 Consistent with our
discussion on the individual's parasitic relation with the law, the
changes that have improved the lives of persons experiencing psychi-
atric illness have been at the hands of the clinicolegal establishment
and not prompted by "progressive" social awareness.53 Thus, while
mental health systems users have attained certain rights they did not
previously enjoy, their dependence on the law for these rights has
remained. 4 What we have, then, is a positive correlation between the
49. See id. at 73. Marianne R. Woodside & Robbie H. Legg, Patient Advocacy: A Mental
Health Prospective, 12 J. MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING 38 (1990). The use of the term
"advocate" includes mental disability lawyers, psychiatric social workers and nurses, activist psy-
chologists, and concerned family members of the disordered citizen. Depending on the
individual case and the particular situation, each of these advocates assumes the role of represent-
ing the perspective of the mental health systems user. See, e.g., LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra
note 36; Woodside & Legg, supra note 49; Gutierrez, supra note 48.
50. See LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 36, at 1-4. See also, e.g., Joseph P. Morrissey &
Howard H. Goldman, Cycles of Reform in the Care of the Chronically Mentally Ill, 35 HOSP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 785 (1984); Joseph P. Morrissey & Howard H. Goldman, Care and
Treatment of the Mentally Ill in the United States: Historical Developments and Reforms 484
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 12 (1986); LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 46.
51. See LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 36, at 6; MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND
MENTAL DISABILITY § 1.01 (1994) reprinted in MICHAEL PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW
3-8 (1999).
52. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 361-65 (Walter Kaufman ed. &
Walter Kaufman & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1968) (1901).
53. See ARRIGO, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 21-22. For example, consider
the manner in which the value of "paternalism" anchored and continues to underscore mental
health law dynamics in the wake of the deinstitutionalization movement. Some commentators
have referred to legal and psychiatric investments in the lives of persons with mental disorders as
nothing short of "illness politics." See generally Bruce A. Arrigo, Paternalism, Civil Commit-
ment, and Illness Politics: Assessing the Current Debate and Outlining a Future Direction, 7 J.L. &
HEALTH 131, 135 (1993). For a more polemical account on the sociology of mental illness, see
generally, SZASZ, INSANITY, supra note 12. Others have traced the value of paternalism in
clinicolegal decision-making from a law and social science perspective, citing examples of sys-
tematic abandonment, or from a critical sociolegal perspective, demonstrating where and how the
medicolegal system historically sustains its own entrenched interests at the expense of psychiatric
citizens. See Arrigo, supra note 53, at 157-62; Arrigo, supra note 4, at 16-20.
54. See ARRIGO, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 22.
[Vol. 24:245
Ethical Advocacy
dependence of psychiatric citizens upon the law, and the enrichment
of their lives (e.g., justiciable rights) as human beings. Again, this
process makes sense only if we understand that such enrichment
comes through or by way of the law.
Clearly, the reliance on the law for "rights claiming" by mentally
ill persons has produced certain effects. For example, invoking the
right to refuse treatment or to receive treatment represents a change in
mental health law.5 However, the assertion of each right requires one
to approach the law.56 That is to say, these are not rights that mental
health systems users can simply "exercise" by act alone: they must
find acceptance from the forces that constitute the law before acting.
Typically, this entails an administrative hearing to determine whether
the person is competently invoking her legally-sanctioned right.57
Mentally "healthy" citizens have the power to act alone; that is, with-
out direct permission from the law. It is assumed that psychologically
well members of society are competent to make rational decisions
regarding their actions and, thus, will often do so. Mentally "ill"
persons, however, must seek permission from the legal apparatus to
act.58 Even then, they are often appointed a qualified overseer (i.e., an
advocate) to champion their interests.59
Thus, in a sense, each time persons experiencing mental illness
(or their representatives) engage the law, they strengthen and bolster
their dependence on it and, further, become somewhat disempowered
because of it. The law assumes more control over their lives and psy-
chiatric consumers reinforce the preexisting medicolegal notion that
they are incapable of advocating on their own behalf.6" This, then, is
the profound paradox mental health citizens confront: to endure with-
out rights (as the law has taken them away), or seek rights from the
law, which, in turn, fortifies the power of the law. As with most para-
doxes, there is no simple solution. In fact, there may be no solution.
Ethically speaking, however, what is important here is that we give
adequate attention to the underlying, often hidden, consequences of
55. See WINICK, supra note 10, at 362-64.
56. See id.
57. See generally JAMES A. HOLSTEIN, COURT-ORIENTED INSANITY (1993); CAROL
A.B. WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT (1982).
58. See LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 36, at 284-321.
59. See id.
60. In critical criminological circles this process amounts to hegemony and reality construc-
tion. See MILOVANOVIC, supra note 19, at 149-50. The legitimacy of the clinicolegal system
(and all of its ideological dimensions), becomes reified; that is, the medicolegal apparatus func-
tions as the dominant arbiter of justice for the psychiatrically disordered through the unknowing
consent of those who are governed by the very (confinement) system of which they are a part.
See ARRIGO, MADNESS, supra note 12, at 137-40.
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our actions and those of others-even when ostensibly acting in the best
interest of subjugated and marginalized groups.
IV. THE ETHICS OF CONFINEMENT PRACTICES
When we speak of the rights of mental health citizens, we gener-
ally refer to those individuals who lost their rights (i.e., were involun-
tarily committed and subjected to the structural constraints of an insti-
tution). This loss of liberty is justified under two separate but inter-
related mental health law doctrines: police power and parens patriae
authority.6" Each embodies underlying ethical assumptions that serve
to rationalize the ensuing action or choice-making impacting the psy-
chiatric citizen in question.62 In Plato's Republic, the former of these"state interests" was alluded to in a discussion involving Socrates and
Thrasymachus.63
The Republic begins with the concept of dikaiosyne, a term that
embodies those conventions that one must respect in the interest of
other people.64 We can think of dikaiosyne as "morality." In other
words, it is a term that signifies a certain morality that should be
obeyed because the interests of others are at stake. Thrasymachus,
however, claims that such "standards" in which moral conventions are
embedded are in the interest of the powerful.6" Morality, then, con-
sists merely of rules imposed by the political powers that constitute a
calculated attempt to preserve the advantage of the ruling class.66 The
rules can be manipulated by those creating them if their interest calls
for it.67 Thrasymachus's response exemplifies the present-day anti-
thetical concerns of the state regarding individuals with mental illness.
61. LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 36, at 15. Manifestations of paternalism and parens
patriae can be traced back to the colonial jurisprudential period of American history; some varia-
tions of these respective doctrines are visible today. For a thorough historical assessment of these
overlapping and interdependent notions, see GERALD N. GROB, MENTAL INSTITUTIONS IN
AMERICA: SOCIAL POLICY TO 1875 (1973); GERALD N. GROB, MENTAL ILLNESS AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY 1875-1940 (1983); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE
ASYLUM (1971); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE (1980); ANDREW
SCULL, SOCIAL ORDER/MENTAL DISORDER (1989). For more of a legal history analysis see
John E.B. Myers, Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: A System in Need of Change,
29 VILL. L. REV. 367 (1983/1984); RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS (3d ed. 1999).
62. See LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 36, at 16-17.
63. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO (A.D. Lindsay trans., 1957).
64. See generally PLATO, THE REPUBLIC AND OTHER WORKS 19-40 (B. Jowett trans.
1973).
65. See PLATO, supra note 63, at 18, 25.




Thrasymachus argues that society's interests are thus not his
*68interests. In fact, immorality would be to one's advantage because
the "just man always comes off worse than an unjust [man]. 69 In
other words, the powerful (i.e., the unjust) gain advantage in every sit-
uation where the common person (i.e. the just) concedes to convention
(conventions, of course, are codified in such a way as to be in the
interests of the powerful).7" Thus, the injustice that is suffered by the
just man at the hands of the law will only encourage the continuance
of the vicious cycle of injustice if one were to always obey.71
A. Taking Away the Human Rights of Persons with Mental Illness
In the context of our present concern, we can think of dikaiosyne
as embodied in the law (i.e., in the law's treatment of the unique con-
cerns of the mentally ill). We recognize that the law is informed by
social notions of what is moral.72 These conceptualizations of "good
vs. bad" and "right vs. wrong" are, of course, based chiefly on Judeo-
Christian teachings.73 At some unspecified historical juncture, how-
ever, the law was no longer formed by morality; rather, morality was
imposed upon society through the administration of the law.74 Our
conception of what one should or should not do increasingly refers to
the edified morality that we have termed law. Again, this reference
may be regarded as an "edifice complex"; that is, a tangled fixation on
the law as an escape from the choices that confront us as human
beings. 75
With regard to confinement practices for persons with psychiat-
ric disorders, the underlying concern is the best interest of the
68. See id.
69. Id. at 25.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See POLLOCK, supra note 30, at 81. For some detailed and targeted philosophical
comments along these lines see John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY,
AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1951) (1863); IMMANUEL
KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS WITH CRITICAL ESSAY (Robert
Paul Wolf ed. & Lewis White Beck trans., 1969) (1785); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971).
73. See POLLOCK, supra note 30, at 14-18. It is often difficult to discern how ethics and
morals are distinct, though overlapping, concepts. Generally speaking, however, morality refers
to conduct that is judged as good or not good (i.e., moral or immoral), and ethics refers to the
assessment of what is defined as good or bad conduct. Id. at 4; VINCENT BARRY, APPLYING
ETHICS: A TEXT WITH READINGS 5 (2d ed. 1985). These distinctions can be traced to
religious (and philosophical) convictions about human behavior. See, e.g., KANT, supra note 72;
Mill, supra note 72. For a recent analysis of how such terms apply to the study of crime and
justice issues, see POLLOCK, supra note 30.
74. See POLLOCK, supra note 30, at 5-8.
75. See MAY, supra note 16, at 52.
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community versus the best interest of the individual.7 6 By Thrasy-
machus's own assertion-and we have no reason to believe that it is
not, to some degree, present in contemporary society-we must regard"community interest" as being defined by those re-presenting the com-
munity's concerns.77 Community standards, then, under the facade of
the "convention" of morality, can be manipulated by way of the law.78
That is to say, those mentally healthy individuals looking out for their
own interests and fitting the nonmentally healthy (i.e., ill) into a social
framework relegitimize their own status while subjecting citizens with
psychiatric disorders to a marginalized and often criminalized
existence.79
This social framework, however, often (historically) implies a
concern for the interests of the community at the expense of the inter-
ests of psychiatric citizens.8" To be sure, the celebrated perspective
that regards persons with mental illness as "dangerous," "undesira-
ble," "deviant," "monstrous," "diseased," "demonic," etc., would nat-
urally incline the community to establish as their particularized
interest the containment and control of those persons identified as
outsiders.81 That is to say, community interests in this context have
traditionally been concerned with keeping the mentally ill away from
the mentally healthy.82 Frequently, these community interests have
been motivated by fear and ignorance.83 Society's persistent percep-
tion of mental heath citizens as dangerous has encouraged the state to
implement police power clauses that allow for the involuntary confine-
ment of psychiatric consumers: persons thought to be a danger to the
76. Arrigo, supra note 53, at 132.
77. See PLATO, supra note 63, at 45.
78. See id.
79. See H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Persons with Severe Mental Illness in
Jails and Prisons: A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 483, 485 (1998). This marginalizing
framework conceives and produces the "mentally ill offender." In other words, the manner in
which legal and psychiatric agents think about, know, and describe psychiatric consumers is
already encoded with a marginalizing and alienating logic, rendering such citizens deviant-
minded, disease-prone, and dangerous-oriented "outsiders." See Bruce A. Arrigo, The Logic of
Identity and the Politics of Justice: Establishing a Right to Community Based Treatment for the Insti-
tutionalized Mentally Disabled, 18 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 23-28
(1992) [hereinafter Arrigo, Logic of Identity]. For a more philosophically animated investigation
of how mental health systems users are criminalized, relying on relevant ethnographic data see
Bruce A. Arrigo, Transcarceration: A Constitutive Ethnography of Mentally Ill Offenders, 85
PRISON J. (forthcoming 2001) [hereinafter Arrigo, Transcarceration].
80. See Arrigo, Logic of Identity, supra note 79, at 12.
81. See Williams, supra note 39.
82. See Arrigo, Logic of Identity, supra note 79, at 11-12.




community.84 The reality for the community, however, is that, in
general, persons experiencing psychiatric disorders are no more danger-
ous than the healthy and competent members of the community.85
Indeed, it may be said that the supposed "rational" decisions of the
mentally healthy can be far more irrational, injurious, and, thus,
dangerous, than the choices made by their presumably ill and incom-
petent counterparts.8 6 As Thrasymachus professed, the "just" are
often led to suffer injustices by conforming to the codified form of
"justice" engendered by the political.8 7
A similar injustice to the mentally ill is enacted by the parens
patriae power of the state. While such power is afforded the state on
the assumption that involuntary confinement is, at times, in the best
interest of the individual, 8 undoubtedly there is a historical element of
morality attached to it. 9 Many of those involuntarily confined "for
their own benefit" are persons whose chosen standard of living differs
markedly from that of the community. Indeed, these are persons
whose existential choices are vastly inconsistent with traditionally held
ways of being, for example, the homeless mentally ill population.9"
The literature concerning parens patriae provides ample evidence of
the confinement of individuals whose only "crime" was difference.91
Again, we must ask ourselves: Does the best interest of the individual
truly receive suitable consideration, or does the interest of the com-
munity (i.e. those maintaining a position of political power) receive
inordinate attention?
We submit that in both cases (the state's police power and parens
patriae authority), dikaiosyne exists as law imposed upon members of
the community, and, under present conditions, is not necessarily in
the interest of all people. Embedded within our moral standards of
community decency and appropriate behavior are those biases that
84. See id. at 1223.
85. See TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS 3 (Robert M. Wett-
stein ed., 1998).
86. See LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 46, at 46-57.
87. See PLATO, supra note 63, at 25.
88. Developments in the Law--Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 83, at 1209-
10.
89. THOMAS SZASZ, M.D., THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS 175-76 (revised ed. 1974).
90. See, e.g., H. Richard Lamb, M.D., Deinstitutionalization and the Homeless Mentally Ill,
35 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 899,900-01 (1984).
91. See, e.g., NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971); SCULL,
supra note 61; THOMAS SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC SLAVERY (1977); Christopher R. Williams, The
Abrogation of Subjectivity in the Psychiatric Courtroom: Toward a Psychoanalytic Semiotic Analy-
sis, 11 INT'L J. FOR SEMIOTICS L. (1998); Williams, supra note 39; ARRIGO, PSYCHIATRIC
JUSTICE, supra note 12.
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favor majoritarian standards of living and pro-social conduct.92 By
subjecting mental health consumers to involuntary confinement in the
interest of the state (i.e., protection against harm to others) or in the
interest of the disordered person (i.e., protection against harm to self),
we maintain that such citizens are subjected to ethical standards con-
structed upon unjust foundations. They are unjust, of course, in the
sense that they do not represent a respect for the interests of all people,
but merely demand a respect for the interests of majoritarian rule.
Thrasymachus, then, would stipulate that morals delimiting practices
for involuntary confinement are not necessarily in the interest of per-
sons with mental illness; rather, they benefit the state and the com-
munity. In this context, we recognize that the community's interests
are esteemed only insofar as codified law (i.e., a political prescription)
articulates a set of moral standards for the community and provides
the illusion or misrepresentation of dangerousness regarding the con-
duct of the psychiatric consumer.
B. Giving the 'Gift' of Rights to Persons with Mental Illness
As noted previously, individuals experiencing mental illness are
in a unique position in contemporary society. Having lost their
human and legal rights, they all too often exist as "prisoners" within a
confinement setting.93 Further, having been civilly and/or criminally
committed against their will, they experience a pervasive struggle with
institutional personnel to enjoy certain rights while detained.94 At the
historical origin of the asylum, the mentally ill were not only stripped
of the right to exist in society, but also the right to exist within the
institution that housed or, perhaps, warehoused them.9" Of course,
agents acting on behalf of citizens with mental illness have succeeded
in establishing a panoply of rights provided to individuals within con-
finement settings.96 While many advocates of psychiatrically disor-
dered persons have been generally pleased with these developments,
we contend there are certain ethical assumptions frequently neglected
or overlooked when evaluating this progress.
We return to the notion of dikaiosyne for guidance. This time,
however, we examine this idea in the context of rights given back to
those whose rights have been appropriated. This process refers to
92. See generally IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE
(1990).
93. See ENNIS, supra note 12, at 3-4.
94. See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 83, at
1193-97.
95. See id.
96. See generally PERLIN, supra note 51.
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morality that is established by the law, enacting and endorsing the
liberty interests (rights) of persons with mental illness. Once again,
we must question whether these afforded rights are in the best interest
of such mentally ill citizens. Given Thrasymuchas's perspective on
dikaiosyne, we must look within these established rights to what may
be hidden underneath their explicit meaning. In other words, are the
liberty interests made available to individuals with mental disorders
tainted by the concerns of those from whom the rights originate? At
first glance, we assume that these rights represent the prerogatives of
psychiatric citizens. This is not to suggest that mental health consum-
ers do not want these rights; rather, we question whether the bestowal
of these legitimated rights truly reflects the unique interests of those to
whom they are given.
Thus, we can pose the question as follows: Do we (i.e., the com-
munity) want what mental health systems users want, or do we want
what we want for them? We will return to this matter in the context of
mental health advocacy. For now, however, we respect the possibility
that the changes that are made in the way of rights for the involuntar-
ily committed mentally ill are often informed by those granting such
rights. For example, would the law truly provide rights for persons
with psychiatric disorders if it were not in the interest of the law or
community that it represented? At the very least, the law is unlikely
to give something to someone or some group that disturbs or chal-
lenges its comfortable existence, its conventional way of being.97
Thus, confronted with the Court's inevitable interest balancing model
of weighing conflicting or competing constitutional rights, the ques-
tion asked is not whether certain liberty safeguards are in the best
interest of individuals experiencing mental illness; rather, the question
posed is how will such protections, if bestowed upon persons with
psychiatric disorders, endanger the community's rights as expressed
through the law? In other words, what can the (clinicolegal) system
afford to give them?
Machiavelli recognized the fact that certain things provided to
others can endanger or, at least, alter one's own existence." Accord-
ingly, he presented an alternative that may be applicable to our
97. See Arrigo & Williams, supra note 36, at 323-25. For a critical legal and criminological
analysis of this position exploring the historical dynamics of paternalism in the civil commitment
of the mentally ill, see Arrigo, supra note 4, at 7. Throughout the practice of confining persons
with mental health disabilities in the United States, system-endorsing values have been at the
heart of reform (salvation informed the moral treatment movement, science informed the mental
hygiene movement, normalization informed the deinstitutionalization movement). See id. at 10-
16.
98. See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 21 (Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. trans., 1985)
(1513).
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present concern. Machiavelli echoed the sentiments of Adeimantus,
another of Socrates' interlocutors in The Republic. Socrates' reply to
Thrasymachus's announcement that happiness is best achieved
through immorality involves a formulation of kinds of good.99 The
second kind of good that Socrates describes is contingent upon the
consequences of one's actions."0 In other words, actions are good (i.e.
moral) if the effects of those actions are beneficial. Adeimantus, in
turn, professes that indeed actions are commendable for their benefi-
cial consequences, but such commendation derives also from effects
that appear to be beneficial.' Thus, actions that are celebrated as
moral and good for their beneficial consequences need only have
effects that are perceived as beneficial. °2 Machiavelli, of course,
repeats this sentiment in asserting that the Prince need not possess
superior qualities that encourage respect, he need only appear to
personify such admirable qualities.0 3
With regard to rights re-presented to persons with mental illness,
we previously noted that such "gifts" were generally not given if the
giver stood to lose something in the transaction. One possible way to
circumvent this danger would be to appear to give gifts (i.e. rights)
that benefit psychiatric citizens when, in reality, the rights merely
embody the appearance of benefit. In this case, nothing real is lost by
the giver, yet nothing real is gained by the receiver. A genuine facade
is established, What ensues, in fact, is that the position of neither
party in the transaction is substantially altered, yet the public (society)
assumes that such beneficial change has occurred because it has been
presented to them in that way.
Thus, providing rights to mental health systems users by way of
gift-giving (i.e., endorsing rights claims) ensures the appearance of
morality (and justice). This is an altered morality that would not have
been necessary had persons with mental illness not been exposed to
the injustices and immoralities of the past (i.e., the loss of human and
legal rights). Consider, for example, the homeless mentally ill popula-
tion. What is introduced into society is the notion that the conse-
quences of involuntarily confining such persons are beneficial. That is
to say, the person whose chosen standard of living is not necessarily
compatible with society's will certainly benefit from forced confine-
ment: the individual will be de-pathologized, made functionally well,
99. See PLATO, supra note 63, at 43.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 55-56.
102. Seeid. at 56.
103. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 98, at 70.
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and corrected." 4 Again, what is important here is that such an asser-
tion is merely an appearance. It is a dramaturgical facade,' 05 repeat-
edly staged to reassure society that everything is being done to
improve the lives of deviant and diseased people when, in reality, such
lives may not need alteration at all. °6 If a lesson is to be learned from
Adeimantus and Machiavelli, it is that we must be wary of appear-
ances: they are often deceiving.
C. A Note on 'Intention'
An additional perspective we must consider before moving to the
ethics of advocacy itself comes from Immanuel Kant. In Foundations
on the Metaphysics of Morality, °7 Kant puts forth a decidedly noncon-
sequentialistic rebuttal to Socrates' "good contingent upon conse-
quences" thesis. He establishes the concept of "good will" as the basis
of morality."'0 8 "Nothing in the world ... can possibly be conceived
which could be called good without qualification except a good will."' 9
When considering the morality of actions, we need not concern our-
selves with the actual consequences of such actions."0  These are
unforeseeable and often uncontrollable."' Rather, what is important
is the intended consequence or the motive of the action."' If the inten-
tion that gives way to an action is immoral, then the act is categorically
immoral-regardless of its consequences and who and how many may
benefit from it."'
To amplify this point, recall our discussion of rights given to
persons with mental illness. If those bestowing such rights act funda-
mentally or exclusively in their own best interest, then the act of giv-
104. Arrigo & Williams, supra note 39, at 200.
105. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961).
106. For example, see ARRIGO, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 104-15. Our
position is not a full-fledged endorsement of homelessness for persons identified as psychiatrical-
ly disordered. Rather, we are questioning the ethico-philosophical conditions that give rise to
confining such citizens and the particular interests that are advanced in the process.
107. KANT, supra note 72.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 11.
110. Id. at 20-21.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. This distinction between act and intent has been examined considerably in
philosophical circles. The former (i.e., the act), is understood to be teleological because it focuses
on the consequence and purpose of the act. See Nancy Ann Davis, Contemporary Deontology, in
A COMPANION TO ETHICS 205, 206 (Peter Singer ed., 1993). The latter (i.e., the intent) is
understood to be deontological because the focus is on the relative "goodness" of the behavior in
all contexts. Id. at 206-07. Classic statements along these lines are found in Mill's utilitarianism
(telelogical) and Kant's ethical absolutism (deontological). For more on these matters see Mill,
supra note 72; KANT, supra note 72.
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ing is immoral for Kant." 4 Such an act would be without reference to
one's "duty" as a human being; that is, the moral duty concerning the"oughts" that are a priori universals."' For Kant, the "good will" acts
according to the moral law and not the law of the legal system."6 If, as
we proposed, the intention of the giver was to deceive society and psy-
chiatric citizens into believing, through appearance, that they were the
receivers of some good, the gift of rights would not be given for moral
reasons. Even if mental health systems users were to benefit from
such a gift, the intention behind the act of giving would render the act
immoral.
Thus, Kant extends our ethical exploration of mental illness and
the rights afforded to those so designated beyond the act of giving per
se, and beyond the consequences of an action. The issue of intention
becomes a decisive factor in the morality of giving and taking. We
contend that intention, along with dikaiosyne, consequences, and ap-
pearances, underscores ethical considerations like those we have thus
far presented. With regard to the confinement of persons with mental
illness (i.e. taking rights away) and the bestowal of the gift of rights
(i.e. giving rights back), we note the importance of questioning the
underlying ethical motivations for our decisions and the decisions of
others. As we subsequently demonstrate, these ethical issues become
even more complex if we consider individual actions, including those
of the mental health advocate.
V. THE ETHICS OF MENTAL HEALTH ADVOCACY
As Lacan observed, "one feels good in the Good" (Man fiilht sich
wohl im Guten).' In other words, happiness is achieved in the long
term by accomplishing good (well-being of self or others) that repre-
sents an index of the Good."' For Aristotle, every human pursuit is
one that aims at some good.' If Aristotle is correct, then we all adopt
and pursue projects that will produce "good" (for Aristotle, this was
measured by the pleasure that was produced by such goods 2°), either
for ourselves or for others. Pursuing good for ourselves or for others
lends itself to ethical treatment in the sense that we question whether,
in fact, it is possible to ever act solely for the good of another. This is
114. See generally KANT, supra note 72.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. PHILLIPE JULIEN, JACQUES LACAN'S RETURN TO FREUD 84 (Devra Beck Simiu
trans., 1994) (quoting JACQUES LACAN, ECRITS 404 (1966)).
118. See id. at84, 86.
119. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHIcS 25 (H. Rackham, trans., 1956).
120. Id. at 23.
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historically captured by the philosophical debate concerning egoism
and altruism.
Returning again to Plato's Republic, there is an ongoing assump-
tion that is shared by both Socrates and Thrasymachus. 12' Through-
out most of the Republic, the two espouse opposing ethical viewpoints;
however, their convictions concerning individual interest related to
individual action are somewhat harmonious. Though this is only
implicit in the oration of Socrates, each seems to recognize that indi-
viduals would not act against their own interests (unless they are igno-
rant as to what is in their best interest).122 In other words, individuals
act in accordance with the interests of the self. This is the principal
assertion of egoism's two forms: people are always motivated by self-
interest (psychological egoism),123 and people ought to be motivated
by self-interest (ethical egoism).124
The polar opposite of egoism is altruism. Altruistic actions are
those in which one appears to sacrifice the interests of oneself in order
to achieve some good or benefit for another. If one adopts the egoistic
perspective on humanity, altruism is not possible--one would never
act against one's own interest.125 Thus, following egoism, even an act
that provides the appearance of altruism is, in fact, in some way bene-
ficial to the individual performing the act. 126 In this sense, sacrificing
one's interests in the name of another's is only conceivable if one con-
siders the act of sacrifice to be in one's own interest. Thus, the sacrifi-
cial "good" is always already intertwined with self-motivations.
Given these observations on egoism and altruism, what is the
role of the advocate? When one thinks of advocacy, one is immedi-
ately drawn to the interpretation that an advocate acts for the good of
the client. 127 In light of the egoist claim that one never acts beyond
one's self-interest, we must question the intention of the advocacy act.
Does the mental health proponent stand to gain from her or his
actions? Or, as the advocate would state, does the client's interest out-
weigh whatever self-motivation the advocate may wish to accommo-
date? In light of these issues, we turn, briefly, to several insights
found in psychoanalytic thought. Psychoanalytic thought serves to
advance our understanding of both the origins of altruism and its very
possibility in forensic practice.
121. See generally PLATO, supra note 63.
122. See id. at 53.
123. JAMES RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 53 (1986).
124. Id. at 67.
125. See id. at 53.
126. See id.
127. See generally Woodside & Legg, supra note 49; Gutierrez, supra note 48.
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
A. The Psychic Origin of Individual Altruism
Any act of altruism, be it pure or motivated by underlying self-
interest, has its origin in some element of the actor's psyche. 12 That is
to say, behaving in an altruistic manner because it is consistent with
the aims of one's society is not sufficient to explain such actions. 129
There is always an intrapsychic component in such motives or, per-
haps, needs. 3° Otherwise, where might this desire for action agreeable
with the altruistic doctrine originate?
In order to adequately assess the source of altruism and its rela-
tion to mental health advocacy, we must briefly consider the infant's
psyche. What is important here is the relationship of the newborn
child to the primary caregiver (typically the mother). We must re-
member that the first satisfying object in the world for the infant is an
object that is similar to the child. 3' The infant's sole means of gratifi-
cation and well-being is the object of the caregiver. 32 Thus, the new-
born child first learns to know, perceive, and recognize the outer world
through an object that is similar to him or herself (i.e. another human
being).' As a result, there is a profound realization that the object
upon which the infant is utterly dependent is another human being.'34
The infant must develop a successful relationship with this other for
gratification-indeed for life itself.35 Of course, the newborn is also
aware that the other can deprive the child of gratification.'36 Generally
speaking, then, it is during the first years of the child's life that the
infant discerns the gravity of other human beings and the need to
identify with them as objects to benefit the self.'37
The primacy of the newborn's relationship to the other is mostly
unconscious over the course of its psychological development. 3 The
significance, however, remains. What assumes primary importance in
subsequent years, though, is the role of memory.'39 As Freud noted,
"... if the object screams, a memory of the subject's own screaming
will be aroused and will consequently revive [one's] experiences of
128. Williams & Arrigo, supra note 28, at 231.
129. See id. at 231-37.
130. See id. at 237-40.
131. SIGMUND FREUD, THE ORIGINS OF PYSCHO-ANALYSIS 393 (Marie Bonaparte et al.




135. See Williams & Arrigo, supra note 28, at 232.
136. See id.





pain. '"140 Thus, the initial relationship that develops between the in-
fant and her or his "similar object" fosters a relationship shared among
all human beings in which experiences of the other (often uncon-
sciously) invoke memories of comparable events in one's own life.'4 1
For example, when we observe another person suffering we feel her or
his pain as another human being. Through the repository of memory
we store our own experiences of suffering and respond to the pain of
others accordingly.
Thus, following Freud, human beings are identified in two ways
by the individual psyche: as an "other"-a separate non-self that
exists in the same world-and as a memory or part of the self.'42 As a
result, when we experience other human beings, we experience them
both as separate from ourselves and as part of ourselves.'43 Given
these comments on the psychic origin of individual altruism and the
psychoanalytic duality of our human existence, what, then, are the
implications of these observations for purposes of mental health advo-
cacy? To examine this question more closely, we must address the
ethic of "love thy neighbor."'44
B. Love Thy Neighbor (As Thyself)
It is a common conviction that morality has been, and is still,
immersed in various philosophical doctrines.'45 While this notion has
some merit, we must understand that Christian dogma is itself rela-
tively new. Further, the notion of altruism has no systematic concep-
tual place in the writings of the ancient Greeks such as Plato. The
historical origin of altruism is often linked with Jesus the Nazarene,
who taught his followers: "love thy neighbor." '46 This connection,
however, is a misperception. What is often overlooked or, perhaps,
neglected in this precept is the remainder of the statement; that is,
"love thy neighbor as thyself.""'14 When the phrase "as thyself' is
rightfully appended to the maxim, it assumes something of an egoistic
character. In other words, "as thyself' draws attention to the self in
the exchange of love. Loving one's neighbor, then, arguably implies
that the self is more important than the other. We should love our
140. Id. at 393.
141. Seeid.
142. See id. at 393-94.
143. See id.
144. Galatians 5:14 (Young's Literal Translation).
145. See the previous sections in which some connections were tentatively drawn between
the philosophy of utilitarianism and morality, as well as ethical absolutism and morality.
146. Galatians, supra note 144.
147. Id.
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neighbors, but only insofar as we love ourselves. Again, we are led to
Hobbes' conclusion that altruism is an impossibility. It can never
occur purely outside the interest of the self.148
An important dimension of this Article's discussion is whether it
is even possible to want the good of the other (i.e., velle bonum
alicui 49), in regard to advocacy in law for persons with mental illness.
Based upon our cursory analysis of individual altruism, its psychoana-
lytic origins, and the dualistic nature of our humanity, we must pon-
der the costs and benefits of this "good." In other words, does the
mental health proponent want the good of the other for the other.., or
for himself? This question is of considerable import when contemplat-
ing the justice (and morality) of advocacy. Indeed, the "good" advo-
cate (referring here both to clinicolegal skill as well as personal ethic) is
always interested in the good of the client." The philosophy behind
advocacy itself is to improve the existence of psychiatric citizens by
brokering and promoting certain qualitative changes (e.g., improved
autonomy, self-determination, social standing) in their lives.' Thus,
the advocate is a representative because he or she wants the good of
the other.
It follows, then, that the revised concern in the altruistic notion
of love thy neighbor is both my good and the good of the other. The
interplay of love thy neighbor and velle bonum alicui produces certain
revelations in our ethical treatment of advocacy. The "good" (bonum)
is often that which I desire for myself and, consequently and by way of
myself, desire for the other." 2 If, as Freud informs us, I see the other
in myself (i.e., I feel the other in myself), then I must also see and feel
myself in the other.5 3 Thus, what I wish for the other is what I wish
148. Indeed, Hobbes' caustic comments along these lines are worth noting. As Rachels
explains:
The charitable [altruistic] man is demonstrating to himself, and to the world, that he
is more capable than others. He can not only take care of himself, he has enough left
over for others who are not so able as he. He is really just showing off his own super-
iority.
RACHELS, supra note 123, at 55 (interpreting Hobbes' description of charity: "There can be no
greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish
his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs: and this is that conception where in
consistent with charity." 4 THOMAS HOBBES, THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES
(William Molesworth ed., 1845)). For a more detailed and philosophically animated assessment
of Hobbes in relation to mental health advocacy, see Williams & Arrigo, supra note 28.
149. JULIEN, supra note 117, at 86.
150. See Williams & Arrigo, supra note 28, at 238-39.
151. See JULIEN, supra note 117, at 86. See also generally LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note
36.




for myself and what I wish for myself is what I wish for the other." 4
The good of the other "is made in the image of mine." 55
We must be mindful, then, of the negative therapeutic reaction
that Freud discusses.5 6 That is to say, we must be wary of desiring
and acting (advocating) for the good of the other when the other, per-
haps, does not even want this good (i.e., this good does not necessarily
belong to the other).5 7 The other's well-being is, at best, a mere
reflection of our own sense of what is good, captured, albeit incom-
pletely and falsely, in our advocacy for the other.' It is all too natural
for human beings to move beyond empathy-to actually "see" and
"feel" the self in the other and the other in the self. Given this, is it
possible, in situations where the bonum of the other is of prima
solicitudo, to extricate the image of oneself from the other, and advo-
cate for the other as solely other?
In psychoanalytic circles, similar concerns arise in the context of
the clinician maintaining the posture of a "reflective mirror." Psycho-
analytic theory, in particular ego psychology, recognizes the impossi-
bility of the emotionless, reflective therapist." 9 Issues of counter-
transference 6 ° (in addition to the unconscious ethical dynamic we
have discussed) create significant impediments to the therapeutic pro-
cess."'6 What is unconscious here becomes critical, as the process of"seeing" and "feeling" oneself in the other is largely latent and sub-
liminal. Thus, the answer to our question concerning the possibility
of extricating oneself from the other's image is resoundingly answered
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Williams & Arrigo, supra note 28, at 234-35.
157. JULIEN, supra note 117, at 86.
158. Id. at 86-87. There is a sense in which this advocacy approximates a Marxian brand
of false consciousness. In short, "[p]eople accept the status quo out of lack of awareness that
viable alternatives exist and out of ignorance as to how their rulers are violating their professed
interests or out of ignorance of how they themselves are being harmed by what they think are
their interests." MICHAEL PARENTI, DIRTY TRUTHS 210-11 (1996). Cohen describes this as
"fabrications of justice," which are "false beliefs held by those disadvantaged by an injustice that
they are intentionally led to hold by those benefiting by the injustice." Ronald L. Cohen, Fabri-
cations of Justice, 3 Soc. JUST. RES. 53 (1989). False consciousness returns us to the hegemonic
and reified legitimacy of the clinicolegal system alluded to earlier. For law-psychology applica-
tions of this phenomenon see, Dennis R. Fox, Psycholegal Scholarship's Contribution to False
Consciousness About Injustice, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 9 (1999); Craig Haney, The Fourteenth
Amendment and Symbolic Legality: Let Them Eat Due Process, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183
(1991); John T. Jost, Negative Illusions: Conceptual Clarification and Psychological Evidence
Concerning False Consciousness, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 394 (1995).
159. See GERTRUDE BLANK & RUBIN BLANK, EGO PSYCHOLOGY: THEORY & PRAC-
TICE 14-15 (1974).
160. Counter-transference is defined as the "unconscious excessive libidinal or aggressive
feelings toward the patient, of which the therapist is unaware." Id. at 12.
161. Id.
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in the negative (particularly if one were not aware of such unconscious
dynamics). Perhaps the answer is and always will be "no." And,
much like the recommendations of ego psychologists on this matter,
one can only hope to be aware of such forces and their consequent
impact on personal ethics and the advocacy process.12
Turning briefly to the egoist conception of act and self-interest in
light of velle helps elucidate this matter. As Julien contends, the
implications of velle are as follows: "I want it to be me and no one else
who accomplishes your good." '  In the case of some disparity
between what the other wants and what I want for the other, a critical
choice arises."' That is to say, does the advocate proceed with a
measured altruism or, instead, does the advocate retain the self-interest
that accompanies egoistic action and impose her or himself on the
other?6 ' The latter intervention is contained in such statements as,
"You will have to acquiesce in light of my velle!" In this case, the
well-being of the other is made to depend on the efficacy of the
advocate. Thus, there is a denial of subjectivity-the client's desire is
subjugated in favor of the advocate's (expert) knowledge/experience of
what is in the mental health consumer's best interest. 166 Of course, as
we discovered with bonum, this knowledge that one supposes often
reflects an understanding of oneself (that is, to the extent that self-
knowledge is possible). In either case (i.e., altruism or egoism), it
would appear that the advocate must consciously assess the motives
behind her or his actions. In light of the problems thus far explored
with regard to mental health advocacy, our only answer may consist of
this process of assessment, awareness, and deliberation.
162. See HOWARD A. BACAL & KENNETH M. NEWMAN, THEORIES OF OBJECT RELA-
TIONS: BRIDGES TO SELF PSYCHOLOGY 262-63 (1990); BLANCK & BLANCK, supra note 159.
HEINZ KOHUT, THE ANALYSIS OF THE SELF: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO THE PSYCHO-
ANALYTIC TREATMENT OF NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDERS 294-95 (The Mono-
graph Series of the Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Monograph No. 4, 10th prtg. 1989).
163. JULIEN, supra note 117, at 86.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See Bruce A. Arrigo, The Logic of Identity and the Politics of Justice: Establishing a
Right to Community-Based Treatment for the Institutionalized Mentally Disabled, 18 NEW ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 11 (1992). In mental health law circles, this decision-mak-
ing is often referred to as "substituted judgement." Questions concerning the efficacy of such
practices center around whether it is ever possible to make choices that the psychiatrically disor-
dered person would make if the individual were competent to make them. For a brief, though
accessible, review of this concept in the civil confinement context, see id. at 10-12. For a critical
criminological assessment of this phenomenon in the criminal confinement context, see Bruce A.
Arrigo, Ph.D. & Christopher R. Williams, Law, Ideology and Critical Inquiry: The Case of
Treatment Refusal for Incompetent Prisoners Awaiting Execution, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 367,403-05 (1999).
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VI. THE PHILOSOPHICAL LIMITS OF ETHICAL
(MENTAL HEALTH) ADVOCACY
We have very provisionally and critically traversed several philo-
sophical boundaries within which ethical decisions concerning mental
illness, rights, and advocacy take place. However, there are other ethi-
cal themes that fall within the scope of our investigation. While it is
not our intention to canvass all of the intricacies related to this topic,
there are, nevertheless, some additional matters that require cursory
explication. These matters include the elitism and competence of the
advocate, as well as the ethic of "ultimate ends" versus "responsibil-
ity." We contend that these issues are quite significant for the nature
of mental health law and advocacy, citizen justice, and the future of
humanism in the psycholegal field. Indeed, the attitude and posture
of the psychiatric consumer's representative, in addition to the ethic of"ultimate ends" versus "responsibility," set important limits to the
manner in which mental health advocacy unfolds.
A. The Advocate: Elitism and Competence
In response to Jeremy Bentham's "calculus of felicity," John
Stuart Mill introduced the notion of quality into the conceptualization
of "good."' 67 Bentham claimed that as all human beings pursue the
pleasure principle, such pleasure could be measured quantitatively
against un-pleasure, or pain."' When considering the behavior of an
individual, the pleasure or pain that such action produces can be
measured against other alternatives.'69 Thus, the "calculus of felicity"
determines what action is good based on the good it produces. 17
What Bentham contributes to our investigation is the notion that
quantitative examination of alternatives can be employed in ethical
decision-making processes to determine the best course of action.
Mill's recourse consisted of the introduction of quality into Ben-
tham's quantitative schema.' For Mill, different goods possessed
different qualities, and the quality of these different goods required
consideration before contemplating action.'72 In other words, it was
not merely enough to identify what actions produced good; rather, the
kind of good produced mattered when determining the best course of
167. Mill, supra note 72, at 10.
168. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 38-41 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970).
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See Mill, supra note 72, at 10.
172. See id. at 12.
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action. According to Mill, there were both higher or cultivated desires
and lower or uncultivated desires. 173 What is important in this treat-
ment of "good," are the persons measuring it. Thus, to measure the
quality of good that action produces, one must retain a certain degree
of competence; that is, one must be cultivated or knowledgeable
enough to know what is a "better" good compared with other goods.
Mill feared that if every individual had an equal vote-given that the
majority of individuals were not cultivated--civilization would
suffer. 17
4
In Mill's ideal scenario, only a small minority would have the
right to express an opinion regarding an issue. The best educated,
the most powerful (in short, the societal elite) would retain decision-
making power."' As abhorrent and inhumane as this may seem, we
submit that it is, in some meaningful way, the philosophy under which
present day mental health law in the United States operates.Y7  The
state assumes that most "uncultivated" citizens (e.g., the mentally ill,
the poor, the disenfranchised) are largely incompetent to make deci-
sions regarding matters about which they are not educated. 178 Thus,
this country functions under a representative democracy; that is, a
government in which a select few competent individuals, whether ap-
pointed or voted in, are chosen to represent the interests of the people.
To what extent and, in what respect, are these notions found in
the psychological and legal communities? The answer is far from
inconspicuous. This "elite" status is one we often unquestioningly
confer upon attorneys, psychologists and, clinicolegal advocates.
Their specialized knowledge speaks for others. Under the present sys-
tem, the mental health law advocate represents the interests of the
psychiatric consumer. 9 Of course, a "re-presentation" always loses
173. Seeid. at 10.
174. See generally id.
175. See generally id.
176. See generally id.
177. For example, see LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 46, at 4-22.
178. Perhaps the most profoundly disturbing example of the state deeming persons with
psychiatric disorders incompetent is the matter of execution. An entire body of law exists
exploring the vagaries under which a prisoner competently exercises (or fails to exercise) his or
her rights in the face of impending death. For a detailed legal analyses on this matter, see Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1989); and Perry v.
Louisiana, 610 So. 2d 746 (1999). For an in-depth law and social science analysis of competency
to be executed in relation to one's right to refuse treatment, see WINICK, supra note 10. For a
critical assessment of the right to refuse treatment doctrine and competency to be executed, see
Arrigo & Williams, supra note 166.
179. We question the ability of mental health advocates to speak for or on behalf of the
psychiatric citizen without also, in some meaningful way, attending to the representative's self-
interests. For a standard law-psychology analysis in which an evaluation of mental health advo-
cacy programs is considered, see Gutierrez, supra note 48. For a critical sociolegal assessment of
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something: it can never fully embody the client's interests as initially
experienced within his or her subjective being.18° This is a danger
inextricably lodged within the current system of mental health law.
Further, given our previous analysis on egoism, this re-presentation of
interests potentially signifies the erosion of citizen justice and human-
istic practices, even from the most well-intended of advocates.
B. Ultimate Ends Versus Responsibility: Weber the Untimely Advocate
The ethics of advocacy postulated by Max Weber proposed a
difference between ultimate ends and responsibility.'8 ' Ultimate ends
implies that a set of values exists that is ultimately right, and that these
values should be fiercely enacted and endorsed.' 82 The ultimate end is
inconsequential in that it does not regard effects as a factor in
determining action.'83 According to Weber, the logic of ultimate ends
requires that we live by these values without concern for the conse-
quences they produce.184 Contrastingly, an ethic of responsibility
recognizes and, perhaps, celebrates the numerous systems of value and
perspective contained within a given society. 8 5  Thus, the ethic of
responsibility endeavors to maximize the values of all persons,
irespective of some ultimate ethical "Truth" that is mistakenly pro-
claimed to exist. 186
the philosophical dynamics limiting such advocacy, see Williams & Arrigo, supra note 28.
180. The re-presentation of the psychiatric consumer's interests is problematic on two
fronts. As Williams and Arrigo explain:
On the one hand, the [interests] of the [client] become an unconscious reflection of
the representative's [interests] or sense of what is "good" and, consequently, fails to
embody completely the wishes and well-being of the client. Thus, advocating for the
good of another is, at best, a re-presentation and, accordingly, can never be the good
that the patient intimately and fully desires. On the other hand, what is lost in this
filtration process of re-articulating, re-presenting, re-constituting the client's [inter-
ests] are all the subtleties and nuances of meaning that form the basis of the client's
[need] for ... mental health advocacy. [Thus] the client is not able to convey his/her
own true sense of agency, identity, being.., the subject forfeits his/her interior self
for the sake of conveying meaning that will be heard (through the voice of the advo-
cate), albeit incompletely, inadequately, falsely.
Williams & Arrigo, supra note 28, at 240. For more of a philosophical and psychoanalytic review
of how this process of re-presentation un-does the interests of mental health system users gener-
ally, see ARRIGO, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 143-74; Bruce A. Arrigo, Legal
Discourse and the Disordered Criminal Defendant: Contributions from Psychoanalytic Semitocs and
Chaos Theory, 18 LEGAL STUD. F. 93 (1994).
181. See FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 120 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright
Mills eds. & trans., 1946).
182. See id. at 120-21.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. Seeid. at 121.
186. See id.
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For the advocate, the distinction between the ultimate ends ver-
sus responsibility models is of consequence, particularly in relation to
one's own ethical values, the values of the medicolegal system, and the
values of the client. For example, if one considers the advocacy role to
consist of "fighting" for the rights of clients at all costs, (e.g., prevent-
ing involuntary hospitalization regardless of client repercussions be-
cause such confinement amounts to unjustified imprisonment that is
the pinnacle of institutional inhumanity), one is acting from within an
ethic of ultimate ends. 187 However, as most would concede, it is, on
occasion, in the best interest of the client to be hospitalized, medi-
cated, treated, etc., as the person's well-being may very well depend
on these interventions. If advocates made choices within such a nar-
rowly construed ultimate ends perspective, they might fail to recognize
that their actions were not consistent with their client's interests. If,
on the contrary, they were willing to recognize that maximizing the
good of all persons might entail action that advocates are not inclined
to invoke (e.g., not involuntarily hospitalizing a homeless mentally ill
client who claims to prefer the outdoor chill of subzero degree weather
to the comfort and warmth of temporary housing or shelter), their
decision-making would be governed by an ethic of responsibility. 188
In both instances, however, the problem of egoism as we described it
remains.
This dilemma in advocacy, based on Webarian ethical models, is
complicated further when turning to the standards of professional
organizations, or the law itself, for guidance. If we accept, at all costs,
those standards delineated in the canons of ethics for psychologists,
social workers, nurses, lawyers, and so on, or even the codified system
of case and statutory law under which rules are established, we sub-
scribe to preconfigured or defined values as ultimate ends. This meth-
od is undesirable. It necessarily neglects the variable nature of being
human: the differing needs of individuals; the differing necessities of
situations; and the differing consequences and differing effects of
action. As we have argued, this is the ethical model too many of us
have come to adopt without sufficient reflection. Something quite
profound about our humanity (and the humanity of others) is intra-
psychically and interpersonally lost in the process. To embrace an
ethic of responsibility, however, is similarly problematic. This course
of action can be the basis of negligence suits, disbarment, suspended
and revoked licenses, and other similar professional difficulties. Inter-
estingly, Weber's position is to endorse an ethic of responsibility when
187. Seeid. at 120-21.
188. Id. at 121.
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faced with consequential situations.189 Regrettably, however, his the-
sis does not examine the matter of egoism as we have delineated it.
VII. ETHNOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS
In the pages that follow, we present four case studies. 9 ' These
anecdotal accounts demonstrate how the ethics of advocacy is fraught
with philosophical considerations that, in many instances, are pro-
foundly problematic, if not altogether vexing. While the circum-
stances in the individual cases vary, they nevertheless symbolize
several ethical pitfalls associated with mental health advocacy.
Throughout each case, we are mindful of: (1) the practical
dilemmas psychiatric consumers confront when subjected to the clini-
colegal system and its interpretation of rights-claiming in the face of
confinement; (2) the obvious limits of the existing apparatus in mean-
ingfully addressing the circumstances of different mental health
citizens; and (3) the essential ethical dilemma mental health advocates
confront, given rights-claiming by psychiatric citizens and the short-
comings of the clinicolegal system. On this latter point, consistent
with our philosophical analysis, two fundamental questions will be
considered: was the mental health advocate's intervention in the best
interests of the psychiatric consumer (i.e., altruism), did it satisfy the
psychiatric citizen's interests and those of others (i.e., measured altru-
ism), or did it meet the needs of others without reflective concern for
the mental health system user's identified needs (i.e., egoism)?; and
finally, did the mental health advocacy endorse an ethic of ultimate
ends or an ethic of responsibility?
For purposes of simplicity and clarity, we begin our presentation
of each case with some basic and relevant ethnographic data.'91 This
189. Seeid.at 120-21.
190. Portions of this section are drawn from ARRIGO, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE, supra note
12, 104-14. We note, however, that in the previous work, attention was given to the troubling
values that law and psychiatry esteem, producing "casualties of confinement." Id. at 104. These
casualties are the result of clinicolegal decisions and practices that inadequately determine and/or
inappropriately discern how some persons with psychiatric problems endure in the midst of
homelessness, crime, chemical addiction, poverty, and the like. For purposes of the present
inquiry, we interpret these four life stories mindful of our philosophical assessment regarding the
ethics of mental health advocacy.
191. The methods used to collect the data were direct and personal: case study observa-
tions, field notes, and interviews conducted over a six-year period (1985-1991) encompass
the bulk of the data collection. All of [the] research [was] based upon extensive contact with
[persons experiencing psychiatrical illness in] Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, [while employed in
the mental health outreach field, addressing the needs of] the city's poor and marginally
housed citizens. [W]e recognize that generalizing from anecdotal material is often chal-
lenged as an empirically unsophisticated technique; [however,] the four chosen narratives
were selected from literally scores of other, equally serviceable, life stories. What makes
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information allows us to respond fairly and completely to the respec-
tive questions identified above. Thus, we examine each narrative sep-
arately, as if interpreting four independent and isolated case histories.
The final section of this Article offers some concluding comments
about the ethics of advocacy for persons with psychiatric disorders.
A. The Case of Edith
Edith lived in the Hill District, a section of Pittsburgh notorious
for its urban decay, high crime, and housing projects. She was a
frequent "guest" of Jubilee Soup Kitchen, a haven for the hun-
gry and homeless providing meals and modest social services
seven days a week to anyone who walked through its doors. It
was at the entrance doorway to Jubilee Soup Kitchen that we
first met Edith.
As she cushioned herself against the wooden archway, Edith
spoke loudly of her passion for "poetry and booze." Her frame
was petite but bulky. Her complexion was sallow and weather
beaten; this was a woman whose life experiences lined her face.
Her crimson eyes shone like two fire balls behind her battered
spectacles. Her body seemed to perspire almost uncontrollably,
in part due to the season and weather (it was summer, very
humid and hot). Her speech was slowed and slurred and she
struggled to be alert and coherent. By all indications Edith had
been drinking and was intoxicated. As we approached her, she
was cordial and receptive. It was at this time that we noticed a
cane positioned by her side. Having dispensed with the intro-
ductions, we used our curiosity over the walking stick as a
vehicle to launch a conversation.
To our dismay, Edith spoke nonchalantly about a relatively
recent suicide attempt in which she jumped from a seven-story
building, shattering the bones in one of her legs. The cudgel
was used as both a mechanism for physical balance and as a
symbol for how emotionally unbalanced she felt. Edith appar-
ently was no novice when it came to flirtation with death. "I've
tried killing myself (pause) I can't tell you how many times.
The only thing that stops me is the liquor (laughing), and that's
these accounts so significant is that they magnify just how inadequate existing confinement
[practices] are [when] responding to the [unique situations of diverse] mental health systems
users.
ARRIGO, PYSCHIATRIC JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 104. This includes the ethical problems




why I wanna get shit-faced all the time. It's this (drinking) or I
die."
What was additionally startling was her capacity to explain how
drinking was not the solution to what she referred to as "obvious
emotional problems." It was on many subsequent visits to
Jubilee and to her apartment that these "emotional problems"
were recounted for us. Rather than detailing the many psycho-
social factors that brought Edith to Jubilee for services and sup-
port, we want to focus our attention on her association with the
mental health and civil commitment system, especially as they
relate to her housing dilemma [and the ethics of advocacy that
subsequently materialized].
Given the permanent injury to her leg, Edith's mobility was
markedly impaired. Complicating her physical impairment were
her limited economic resources. As a welfare recipient [Edith's]
income was modest (under two hundred dollars a month). Al-
though [she] lived across the street from Jubilee, [Edith] did not
visit the soup kitchen daily. Complaining that the steep uphill
walk was "too painful," Jubilee take-out food was delivered to
her apartment on those days when she did not visit the soup
kitchen. On several occasions, we volunteered to deliver jarred
hot soup to Edith. It was during these instances that we realized
just how inadequate her living arrangement was in light of her
alcohol abuse and chronic depression.
Edith lived alone (with an unnamed cat) in a dilapidated two-
story building that was mostly abandoned. She occupied the
basement flat. Upon entering the apartment, a very small and
narrow kitchen greeted you. This area quickly opened up to a
larger living room. Off to the immediate right was a bathroom,
and further in this direction there was a bedroom. The apart-
ment was festooned with newspapers, magazines, clothing, jars
of food (many of which were from Jubilee), and other assorted
paraphernalia. When we visited Edith, she was either drinking
excessively or talking about death. On at least two separate
occasions this fixation with death prompted a thorough discus-
sion of treatment options, which inevitably included the possi-
bility of civil commitment. During both conversations, Edith
concluded that she needed to be psychiatrically hospitalized.
[Ostensibly, our advocacy goal], then, was to facilitate the
process as quickly and as smoothly as possible.
Since Edith did not have insurance (other than what welfare's
medical assistance provides) she was not eligible to seek private
2000]
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care. This meant that her choices were limited to the various
community mental health facilities in the city of Pittsburgh.
County guidelines in many states, however, require that an indi-
vidual requesting psychiatric services must receive said services
from the Base Service Unit (BSU) in which that person resides.
Pittsburgh and Allegheny County adopt this position. Edith
could only be treated at the BSU, at that psychiatric facility in
the area in which she lived, regardless of her comfort level with
that particular institution. In the past, Edith had relied upon the
very community mental health center to which we were forced to
take her. Her prior experiences with this hospital were not good.
By her own admission, Edith was a difficult patient--conde-
scending and offensive to staff, obnoxious and troublesome to
other patients.
The initial assessment included separate questioning. A clinical
social worker met with Edith to discuss her emotional condition
followed by consultation with us regarding our own involvement
with Edith. Both sessions dealt with why Edith needed to be
hospitalized and treated. Subsequent inquiry was conducted by
an attending psychiatrist. On both occasions when hospitaliza-
tion was explored, the outcome was the same. First, Edith was
dually diagnosed: she was chemically dependent, and appropri-
ate psychiatric treatment would require that alcohol detoxifica-
tion and rehabilitation be pursued as a necessary precursor to
any intervention with her clinical depression. Although securing
detox/rehab would be difficult (the available space was limited
and the typical waiting lists for such services were long), the
chemical dependency issue would, nonetheless, need to be
addressed first. Second, Edith was not dangerous or gravely
disabled in the clinicolegal sense.'92 Therefore, psychiatric hos-
pitalization (voluntary or otherwise) was not warranted. Some
suggestions were made about alternative housing for Edith,
including, community residential rehabilitation (CRR) services
designed to provide structured care. The intimation was that
monitoring Edith would be wise and that if CRR housing could
be obtained, our concerns for Edith would be allayed. In any
case, Edith was free to go.
The underlying problem with the hospital staffs advice was (is)
directly linked to the failure of civil commitment laws and their
relationship to inadequate housing for psychiatric consumers.19 3
192. In order for one to be civilly committed, mental illness alone is insufficient. In addi-
tion, the person must either be a danger to her or himself or others, or be gravely disabled. See,
e.g., 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7301 (Supp. 2000).
193. For a detailed assessment of this problem, see THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL (H.
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Mental health systems users are denied access to hospital treat-
ment because they must demonstrate that they are a danger to
themselves and/or others. In Pennsylvania this is understood to
mean that the person is a clear and present danger as evidenced
by certain behaviors identified over the past thirty days in which
the individual has formulated some plan in the furtherance of
their being a danger.'94 Drinking yourself to death does meet
the dangerousness criterion in Pennsylvania or any other state.
Complicating the matter is the fact that persons who might
otherwise be treated in psychiatric facilities if confinement laws
were expanded must rely upon alternative systems for services
and care. Because these systems (drug and alcohol facilities as
well as supportive housing agencies) are burdened by the needs
of an array of consumers (e.g., the decarcerated, the elderly, the
physically disabled, veterans, etc.), resources are scarce. The net
effect is that persons like Edith must choose between two dissat-
isfying options-become mentally ill in the clinicolegal sense in
order to receive psychiatric treatment, or exist as they are and
hope that waiting list delays are only short term. The tragedy of
Edith's predicament was that two years after our first encounter
with her, she was found dead in her apartment. In order to
arrest her chemical dependency, she was prescribed the alcohol
inhibitor antabuse. Unfortunately for Edith, she drank while on
antabuse, which produced uncontrollable convulsions, vomiting,
chills, and the like. She subsequently suffered a massive heart
attack. Given the manner in which she lived (alone and as an
invalid), no one was present to intervene or help her.19s
In the context of mental health advocacy, the case of Edith is
ethically problematic. Although she wanted to be hospitalized and
treated for her depression, Edith could only appeal to the very system
(i.e., the clinicolegal apparatus) responsible for determining her pre-
sent status as a (psychiatric) consumer. The system to which she
turned was unwilling to acknowledge that Edith was both chemically
addicted and psychiatrically depressed. Instead, the community men-
tal health facility, consistent with the law, required that she receive
Richard Lamb ed., 1984). For a legal analysis see Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty:
Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375 (1982). For a
philosophical critique of the legal and psychiatric response to the homeless mental ill, emphasiz-
ing community-based treatment see Arrigo, Logic of Identity, supra note 79.
194. For a detailed assessment of the relevant involuntary civil commitment standard in
Pennsylvania, see Susan Paczak, Pennsylvania Standard for Involuntary Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: A Clear and Present Danger?, 27 DUQ. L. REV., 27, 325 (1989).
195. ARRIGO, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 105-08 (citations added by
author).
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alcohol detoxification and rehabilitation services before any mental
health treatment occurred.
Our advocacy posture toward Edith (to champion the cause of
involuntary treatment) was ethically driven, knowingly or not, by the
principle of measured altruism. In addition, the philosophical limits
of our representation were guided by the ethical principle of ultimate
ends decision-making. These observations can be traced to how Edith
interpreted her situation and how we responded to it. Indeed, Edith's
repeated plea for hospitalization, for example, was a vivid reminder to
us of her fragile mortality, and of our own. The excessive drinking
became simultaneously the source and the product of her depression.
I've got an illness, a disease. It's not my fault. I can't stop my-
self from thinking. I can't stop myself from thinking (holding
her head with her hands firmly and crying). Look at me. I'm
nothing. I'm already dead. The drinking, it's about being dead.
I need to go to the hospital. I'm dead (crying). I'm all dead! If
they put me away a least I can die like the crazy fool that I am.
At least I can die there with my illness.'96
It is difficult, if not impossible, to stare in the face of a person's
suffering, knowing full well that it pervades her or his life. This is
particularly true when the depth of the pain is genuine, agonizing,
incessant. We could easily relate to Edith's torment. Her insistence
that she be hospitalized spoke to us, passed through us, activating our
own experiences of suffering, loss, and misery. Edith wanted to rid
herself of her demons. We wanted to assist her, in part, because we
understood her pain and the possibility of dying. Connecting with
these realities (i.e., suffering and impending death) is a function of
being human. Thus, our mental health advocacy proceeded from this
vantage point and, accordingly, was informed by both her very real
dread and by our identification with it.
In addition, our motivation to assist Edith stemmed from how
we interpreted her unique situation and what we believed was in her
best interest. Based on the comments she made about her acute condi-
tion and our appraisal of her life circumstances, an ethic of ultimate
ends guided our advocacy efforts. The ethic of ultimate ends inter-
venes on behalf of another when some larger, desirable good (e.g.,
truth) is at stake. We believed Edith would die and, like her, did not
want this to happen. Affirming life was the ultimate end that moti-
vated our ethical posture toward Edith and the mental health law
system to which she was intimately, albeit partially, connected. Here,
196. Interview by Bruce A. Arrigo with Edith, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Jul. 1986).
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too, we note how our concern for Edith's well-being made sense by
way of the value we assigned to living. Thus, measured altruism was
linked both to the ethics of our advocacy and to its philosophical
limits.
B. The Case of James
We first met James when the downtown YMCA [in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania] voiced some concern about how he was living.
The YMCA had a history of providing subsidized housing to
various low-income groups. 197 Apparently James had not been
seen outside his room for some time, and the housekeeping and
front desk staff were concerned about his overall condition.
James was a frail and emaciated man with unkept hair/beard
and disheveled clothing. He appeared to be in his early sixties.
He lived in a single-room unit that had no cooking facilities and
no bathroom. However, there was a cafeteria in the lobby and
two community bathrooms were provided on each of the sixteen
floors for tenants. James' flat was [messy] and odorous. Various
papers and linens were scattered about and the stains on his
sheets indicated that he suffered from urinary incontinence. He
moved awkwardly and slowly, feet barely rising above the tiled
floor of his room. His speech was slurred and his thought pro-
cesses were disorganized. He was not oriented to time or place.
James was expressionless during most of our conversations and
his affect was typically flat.
Our preliminary assessment was that he had some form of
organic brain dysfunction. There was, however, one thing that
captured his attention. A large color television was strategically
positioned against the wall facing his bed. Every time we visited
James, the channel was set to a soap opera. When asked who he
identified with in these soap operas, James' response was always
the same: "I like the doctors." When we pressed him to de-
scribe why he liked the doctors, he eventually told us: "because
I'm a physician."
At first we stared blankly in disbelief. Then, after we asked him
to repeat what he said, James went to his cluttered desk and
197. Various minority and vulnerable groups constituted the YMCA. In some instances,
these groups experienced difficulty with community reintegration and resocialization. In other
instances, there was less difficulty with assimilation. For an assessment of how the community
functioned, mindful of crime and deviance in the community, see Bruce A. Arrigo, Rooms for the
Misbegotten: Social Design and Social Deviance, 21 J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 95 (1994).
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pulled out some papers. These papers were college and medical
school diplomas. He also showed us records verifying that he
was an honorably discharged veteran and pay stubs document-
ing that he had spent some time working at the Allegheny
County Morgue as a forensic pathologist. All of this material
left us feeling unnerved and stunned. What he [told us] was
true. Our concern[, however,] was with why this man lived the
way he did and whether he wanted to change his situation. [It
was at this juncture that we began to assess how we might advo-
cate on his behalf.]
After many visits to James' single-room apartment over several
months, we learned that he had experienced cardiac problems
several years prior to his arrival at the YMCA. As he lived on
his own, there was no one to attend to James' physical needs.
He also was a frequent inpatient of the local mental health vet-
eran's hospital, where he was treated for depression and chronic
organic brain syndrome (OBS) difficulties....
James had been involuntarily hospitalized on four separate occa-
sions from 1976 to 1984. Three of these confinements lasted
approximately 28 days. The other civil commitment extended
over a three month period. In each instance, hospitalization and
treatment were legally ordered because James was gravely disa-
bled; he was deteriorating to a point where he no longer was eat-
ing, sleeping, or generally caring for his physical well-being. On
each occasion, however, when the hospital determined that he
was able to care for himself as evidenced by his ability to reason
and his willingness to consent to outpatient psychiatric care,
James was released. The release was based upon the hospital's
commitment to the least restrictive alternative doctrine as articu-
lated through the law.... 19 8  While James initially kept his
promise to frequent the veterans' hospital for medication moni-
toring and other services, in time he simply disappeared leaving
no trace of his whereabouts. Following his lack of hospital con-
tact, he typically ran out of his prescription medications or no
longer relied upon them to help him through the day. Moreover,
those symptoms which so poignantly struck us when we first
encountered James, resurfaced and haunted him during his more
protracted periods of anonymity.
198. Essentially, the doctrine requires that the locus of care be the least restrictive and the
type of intervention be the least invasive. For a law and social science assessment of this doc-
trine, see Arrigo, supra note 53. For a legal interpretation of this right see, Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972).
[Vol. 24:245
Ethical Advocacy
So complete was James' psychiatric decompensation that much
of the preceding information he could not recall himself. Medi-
cal charts filled in the missing bits of information. James had
cycled in and out of the mental health system almost by chance.
Fortunately for him, people in his community were concerned
about his general welfare. Every person filing [civil commit-
ment papers] requesting that involuntary treatment be [ex-
plored] was essentially a stranger to him. The point is that [the
psycholegal system] did not work to ensure that James received
the on-going, non-crisis care that he needed. [We concentrated
our advocacy efforts principally with those systems that were
obligated to attend to James' psychological and social needs.] In
the end, because he had so deteriorated, the veterans' hospital
[agreed] to accept him as a[n] [in-patient] in their geriatric unit,
where he lived until he passed away some five years ago.'
99
The rights-claiming problem for James was that he became a
part of a revolving door system of psychiatric care. The lack of regular
community-based mental health assistance and intervention sustained
his cycle of short-term, in-patient treatment. The ethical dilemma we
confronted as advocates was particularly onerous. Indeed, similar to
Edith, James expressed a desire for hospitalization, although for very
different reasons. On those occasions when James did communicate
with us, he made clear just how complicated his situation was. Com-
menting on his place in the YMCA, James explained:
[t]his is where I live.., but it's not where I belong. I'm a doctor
and sometimes I go to the hospital but I don't stay. I can't stay.
It's not possible for me to stay even though I'm a doctor.200
Unlike Edith, who wanted to be civilly committed because she
believed imminent death would follow absent treatment, James
wanted to be hospitalized because he identified with the world of phy-
sicians, notwithstanding his chronic symptoms of psychiatric illness.
Our response to James was to present his interests to the veterans'
hospital, but not for the reasons that he so desperately desired. We
did not broker on his behalf by explaining to the veterans' hospital
that James' status as a physician required that they psychiatrically care
for and treat him. This was, however, what James wanted. This was
his expressed interest. Instead, we re-presented his needs to the hos-
pital in such a way that they acknowledged his status as a physician
but responded to him as a decompensating patient. In other words,
199. ARRIGO, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 108-10 (citations added by
author).
200. Interview by Bruce A. Arrigo with James, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Dec. 1986).
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the staff honored its commitment to James as a sick veteran in need of
ongoing, in-patient mental health services but not as a fellow doctor
whose chronic decompensation exacerbated his already physically
debilitating and emotionally depleting life circumstances.
Ethically speaking, therefore, our mental health intervention was
philosophically informed by egoistic principles. We wanted to assist
James, but on our own terms, believing this to be in his best interest.
In addition, the limits of our advocacy were conditioned by ultimate
ends decision-making. In short, we valued the goal of psychiatric
treatment above all else, including his heart-felt wish to be esteemed
as a physician. This is not to suggest that we failed to appreciate
James' identification with physicians; rather, while recognizing this
we, nonetheless, arranged for hospital intervention.
C. The Case of Larry
Larry was a young man in his early thirties, approximately 5 feet
5 inches tall with a compact and sturdy frame. He lived in an
apartment on the South Side of Pittsburgh. Our introduction to
Larry occurred while he was waiting for St. Mary's "Red Door"
Church to open. This church provides a late-morning lunch,
usually including sandwiches and donuts, to anyone who stops
by, Monday through Saturday. On this particular day, Larry
was early and stood in line with others waiting for the "Red
Door" to open. His head was shaved except for a thick batch of
hair that dangled from the center of his crown to the small of his
back. His ears were pierced and several tattoos were visible.
Among these were "love" and "hate," proudly displayed on both
his hands. He wore a goatee and sported a patch over his left
eye. In sum, his appearance suggested a pirate or some other
menacing figure.
When we approached Larry, he was overly gracious, thanking
us routinely and relying upon other conventions of polite
conversation. Strangely enough, woven into his affable com-
mentary, was a dependency on vulgarity and violent imagery.
He would in one breath be inquisitive and kind and then
demanding and nasty. It was as if he was attempting to control
(suppress) the one side of his personality that troubled him (the
offensive side) but not always with success. The sheer strength
of character and depth of intelligence with which he undertook
this task was amazing. We soon came to realize that Larry pre-
sented himself as a schizophrenic.
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What interests us in this narrative, though, is [the character of
our mental health advocacy, given that existing] confinement
laws and policies did not provide a large enough safety net for
Larry's unique situation and personality.
Given Larry's unusual behavior, he at times seemed abrasive
and rude. During many subsequent conversations we found
him to be alternately pleasant and acerbic. Some would simply
ignore his more repulsive conduct while others felt compelled to
respond. When questioned about his more caustic remarks,
Larry explained them as follows:
I don't know what happens to me. It's like I'm talking and
then suddenly, man, there someone else that's talking for
me but like it's still me. I don't know why I do it. I don't
know why I do it! It just happens and then people get
pissed off."
On one occasion when Larry's offensive personality surfaced, he
repeatedly referred to someone's mother as a "bitch and whore"
without the slightest provocation. Not surprisingly, there was a
brutal scuffle and the police were called. Both men were taken
to the county jail. In Larry's case, "doing time" in the local
lock-up only exacerbated his more primitive persona. He
became hostile with other inmates. Complicating his situation
was a history of prior offenses including multiple assaults and
other violent activity. While the criminal justice system had
previously incarcerated Larry and had acknowledged his schizo-
phrenia by treating him in a unit with other persons considered
criminally insane, he was eventually released from custody.
Since Larry was often very successful with holding in check his
violent personality, especially when on the appropriate antipsy-
chotic medication, civil commitment was not explored. He was
well, or well enough, according to conventional clinicolegal wis-
dom and therefore was free to live as he chose. Unfortunately
for Larry, his violent outbursts accumulated to the point where a
judge sentenced him to a three-to-nine year prison term, where
he remains to this day.
Larry's case, as it relates to institutionalization, illustrates the
inflexibility of the present apparatus. Persons like Larry are well
in the eyes of the law. They possess the capacity to maintain
themselves for extended periods of time without the assistance of
the mental health system. This capacity is proven time and time
again when these consumers attend to their outpatient therapy/
medication appointments or otherwise remain in contact with
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community-based social service agencies. In Larry's instance,
living on his own as he did for many years, visiting St. Mary's
church routinely, engaging in polite conversations, were all signs
that he was competent. [The manifestation of] felonious con-
duct therefore result[ed] in his being treated as a potential crimi-
nal. Larry's violent behavior was not excusable nor do we ques-
tion his [psychological abilities]. Moreover, the point is not that
the criminal justice system, given existing options, mistakenly
intervened when adjudicating Larry's case. What we draw
attention to is how the confinement system, through the.., law,
renders services to a narrowly defined constituency that does not
include individuals who are, in many respects, like Larry. [The
practical problem for Larry was] not so much a matter of a
forced choice: become mentally ill in the clinicolegal sense or
exist as you are and hope that other health and human service
agencies assist you (the case of Edith). The [practical] dilemma
[was] not one of reactively acknowledging mental illness in
which treatment merely follows decompensation, thereby per-
petuating a cycle of hospital care (the case of James). Instead,
the practical issue was one of defining wellness! If you are not
sick in the clinicolegal sense you must therefore be well. This
notion is applied to a broad range of psychiatric consumers. Not
only do the laws and practices of confinement identify who is
deserving of hospitalization and treatment, but they also deter-
mine what it means to be well and who qualifies for such ser-
vices. The result is that for persons like Larry, confinement
policies offer no relief and no protection. Consequently, incar-
ceration is perceived as the only logical alternative.0 1
Larry's rights-claiming was confounded by our ethical treatment
of him and by our advocacy posture toward him. On the one hand,
we admired Larry's ability to contain his demons so efficiently. The
sheer force of will it took to manage his interpersonal relations and
social surroundings was remarkable. On the other hand, Larry was so
unpredictable that we were never certain when he would harm himself
or someone else. Indeed, his repeated past behavior was a clear
indicator of his potential for violence at any moment. Thus, notwith-
standing his protestations to the contrary, our advocacy was guided by
the principle of egoism; that is, we believed it was in Larry's best
interest to be confined.
We also note that Larry's struggle to understand his own identi-
ty was truly insightful, as it significantly impacted our advocacy stance
toward this deeply tormented individual. Not only did Larry appreci-
201. ARRIGO, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 110-12.
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ate the confinement dilemma he confronted, he could lucidly articulate
why he should remain free from any form of institutional control:
They put me away, man. It's not right. That's all I mean to
them. I'm someone to put away to rot. I'm not an animal, no
sir. You can't put me away like that, can't treat me that way.
Sure I get upset. Everybody gets upset. Then I'm supposed to
take this medicine (revealing a pill container) and be good. I am
good, right? They put me in the hospital with crazy people. I
know I'm sick but I'm not crazy, right? I don't think I'm crazy.
(Laughing). Crazy people can't think straight. Look at me. I
got a place to live. I get my money and eat and take care of
myself. And then they lock me up an the jail. (Angrily) I'm not
a criminal! I get upset. I get upset, that's all. People get on my
nerves sometimes, that's all. They don't understand me. I'm
just a little sick but you can't tell me I'm crazy, and I'm not
someone who, like, robs a bank or something. That's not me.202
We admired Larry's ability to frame his predicament as thought-
fully and powerfully as he did. We felt a certain kinship toward him
and his resolute hope for unencumbered, independent living. Thus,
the limits of our advocacy philosophy were informed by the ethical
values he espoused regarding his freedom. Indeed, an ethic of respon-
sibility was very much a part of our engagement with Larry. We
wanted to maximize his interests, his values, his way of knowing and
experiencing the world (i.e., the ethic of responsibility), but only from
within the preconfigured limits of what was best for him-that is,
what was best for society (i.e., the philosophy of egoism). This strange
and contradictory mixture produced in us a curious allegiance to
Larry; one that applauded his presence in the community but also
breathed a sigh of relief when civilly or criminally institutionalized.
D. The Case of Clay
[Similar to] Larry, we first met Clay at St. Mary's Church. He
sat nervously, huddled-up by the doorway, inhaling a bologna
and cheese sandwich. His hair was long, matted, and blond.
His clothing was tattered, loose-fitting, and fading. Clay (or
"Caveman" as he was called on the streets) wore no socks or
shoes, owned no articles of clothing other than the ones on his
back, lived in no home or apartment, collected no income from a
job or from a government check, boasted of no family or friends.
His only possession was a satchel that contained the miscellane-
202. Interview by Bruce A. Arrigo with Larry, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Sept. 1986).
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ous items of a would-be artist-various textured papers, assorted
pencils, and brushes.
Clay had never been inside a mental institution. In many
respects this was no surprise to us. He was engaging, intelligent,
and inquisitive. This is not to suggest that Clay was not unus-
ual, especially given the manner in which he lived. The point is
that he was no danger to himself or others. Clay did, however,
ruminate about several matters. We spent many frustrating
hours discussing his feelings on a variety of life issues: his inde-
cisiveness toward and apathy for work, his anxiety and torment
over returning to Hagerstown, Maryland (his birth place), his
rage and sense of abandonment over a failed romantic relation-
ship. In [some important sense], Clay's existence symbolized
the fear (in his case horror) one confronts when taking a position
or making a decision. He was immobilized by his fear, unable to
fully embrace any notion and therefore avoiding the conse-
quences of his choice [making] at all costs. The only belief he
was wedded to was a profound sense of despair for his present
condition and his uncertain future.
Clay's narrative is also important given the existing state of con-
finement laws. Unlike Larry, who was known to the mental
health system as someone who could mostly manage on his own,
Clay became the target of involuntary (civil or criminal) treat-
ment. Over the seven years we maintained contact with Clay,
he stayed just one night in a [city] shelter, two weeks at an
acquaintance's apartment, [and] one weekend in the county jail.
In the first instance, the weather had plummeted to 10 degrees
below zero with a wind chill factor that made it feel closer to 50
degrees below zero. In the second instance, Clay was engaged in
a large clean-up project that forced him to work late at night.
He neither received nor asked for any compensation and simply
worked until he was exhausted. In the third instance, the local
police were instructed by the Mayor's office to engage in a"sweep of the streets" to protect homeless people from the anti-
cipated harsh ([i.e.,] bitter [and deathly] cold) weather. Clay
was spotted on the street, resisted the police intervention, was
eventually apprehended, and was subsequently confined. On all
other occasions, Caveman lived in the woods, relying on a make-
shift tarp for comfort and newspapers for warmth.
Clay was very much aware of the vagrancy laws and the
[Pennsylvania] statute[s] governing civil commitment." 3 He
203. 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7301 (Supp. 2000).
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understood the dangerous and gravely disabled standards in
Allegheny County and had argued, quite convincingly, that he
was taking care of himself.
This is my life! I have the right to do what I want with it.
Why should I get a job?... For what? Who needs the
hassle and responsibility that you put up with on minimum
wage, or that comes with living like everybody else? I know
where I live. I know I eat here (St. Mary's). I know I ain't
got any money. Big deal! At least no one's after me to pay
my rent, put food on the table or make more money. And
don't tell me about Welfare neither (sic) because it's all part
of the same bullshit system. You're the ones that are crazy
for giving into the system.
Despite his insight, Clay was susceptible to the moral outrage of
any person willing to invest the time and energy to pursue his
institutionalization. This was especially the case during those
cold and wintry months where he would sit on the pavement
shivering, his body a ball-shaped object, rocking himself for
comfort. On two separate occasions, Caveman was hospitalized
for psychiatric care. Eventually he was released and spoke of
nothing but his outrage.
The story of Clay is [significant] because it once again is indica-
tive of a confinement system that struggles to identify an
effective mechanism for psychiatric intervention. Unlike the
previous cases, Clay symbolizes those individuals who challenge
existing social norms about how one should live. The point is
not that persons who are homeless deserve to be so or that they
all choose their circumstances. However, those individuals who
consider or accept an alternative way of life like homelessness-
although uncomfortable to witness and accept-lack protections.
The laws of confinement fail individuals like Clay because,
regardless of how well these citizens think they are or act, they
are considered to be sick and in need of treatment by clinicolegal
decision brokers." 4 Unlike Larry, who needed some type of
204. One seminal legal case along these lines is the story of Billie Boggs. Boggs v. New
York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340 (1987). Boggs, a homeless woman, found
herself subjected to involuntary civil commitment, notwithstanding her capacity to care for her-
self, albeit in an unconventional way. She lived on Second Avenue, in New York County, which
was "identified as her bedroom, toilet, and living room." Id. at 343. The psychiatrist testifying
on behalf of Project Help (a New York City-based service for homeless persons with psychiatric
disorders), determined that Ms. Boggs was severely mentally ill and required "immediate hospi-
talization." Id. At the administrative hearing for sustained civil commitment, Ms. Boggs was
released. Id. at 360. The hearing judge found that Ms. Boggs was "rational, logical, [and]
coherent" throughout her testimony, and was not a danger to herself at the time of the initial
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[ongoing] monitoring because of his propensity for violence,
Clay needed to be left alone until he was ready to make a deci-
sion about his life. [Thus, our mental health advocacy for Cave-
man unfolded accordingly. Notwithstanding our efforts,] the
confinement system made decisions for Clay. His way of life
and his ["offensive"] condition suggested to clinicolegal practi-
tioners that he was in significant distress or was seriously deteri-
orating and, therefore, was unable to care for himself. The
result of the system's intervention is that today Caveman con-
tinues to live on the streets, mostly avoid[ing] contact, and
distrust[ing] anyone who approaches him.2"'
Philosophically speaking, our advocacy posture toward Clay was
motivated by principles of measured altruism. In addition, the limits
of our representation were guided by the ethic of responsibility. Our
relationship with Caveman led us to conclude that he was capable of
living without most, if not all, forms of state-sponsored assistance. To
a large extent, we admired Clay's rugged independence. His indig-
nant frankness and righteousness about how systems manipulate and
control people spoke to us, passed through us, connecting with our
own experiences of how, intended or otherwise, the criminal justice,
mental health, social welfare, and child and youth systems patholo-
gize, criminalize, and normalize (i.e, fail) the very people for whom
their interventions are designed. Clay wanted to be free to travel as he
pleased, without governmental intrusion. We wanted to assist him, in
part, because we understood and embraced his convictions. Thus, our
mental health advocacy unfolded from this unique filter and was
simultaneously anchored by his and our belief in the right to self-
determination.
In addition, affirming the values that gave meaning to Clay's life
underscored our (mental health) advocacy efforts. When one recog-
nizes the uniqueness of situations and makes ethical decisions that
maximize the good of persons where chosen actions may not be con-
sistent with how one would otherwise elect to socialize, live, or be,
then an ethic of responsibility governs behavior. We did not glorify or
romanticize Clay's life as a street dweller. We were not enamored
hospitalization. See id. at 365-66. On appeal, the New York County Supreme Court, Appellate
Division reversed the hearing judge's decision. Id. at 366. The appellate court was particularly
concerned with how Ms. Boggs cared for herself. The court argued that civil commitment could
be order if petitioner's mental illness "manifests itself [as] neglect or refusal to care for [one]self
to such an extent that there is present 'serious harm' to [one's] own well-being." Id. at 362. For
additional analysis of the Boggs case, mindful of several philosophical and sociolegal problems
associated with it, see Williams & Arrigo, supra note 166.




with his wandering, living mostly alone, with few resources and even
fewer friends. Instead, we understood how homelessness mattered to
him and, thus, we were ethically prepared to accept it and philosophi-
cally willing to advocate for it, for his good and for our own.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The four case studies previously described dramatically reveal
how inadequately the mental health law system addresses the individ-
ualized needs of psychiatric citizens. We maintain that at the center of
this failure are matters of ethics, texturing the advocacy that occurs.
Moreover, we contend that a number of philosophical limits substan-
tially underscore the nature of this ethical re-presentation. Although
clearly not exhaustive, the cases of Edith, James, Larry, and Clay
collectively indicate that the philosophy of egoism and measured altru-
ism do motivate mental health advocacy dynamics, and that their con-
tours are varyingly linked to an ethic of ultimate ends (i.e., idealized
truth) and responsibility (i.e., the psychiatric consumer's truth).
In this Article, we argued that questions about ethics, rights,
mental illness, and advocacy, in the context of clinicolegal decision-
making, affect the humanity and justice of those individuals involved
in the process. This was certainly the case for Edith, James, Larry,
and Clay. In general, we have not provided many answers. This was
not our intention. Instead, we explored a myriad of questions. The
purpose of this exploration was to educate and to encourage thought,
consideration, and introspection. Our excursion was meant to take the
reader beyond the obvious, beyond books and conscious experience, to
conceptual vistas she or he may not have immediate access to on an
everyday level. These are the often uncharted places on the map of
one's profession. Perhaps they do not even appear on the blueprints
that our profession provides us. These are the destinations of personal
insight and social change-places that move human thought forward
where previously it stood still and stagnant.
To be sure, clinicolegal advocacy, as an institutional mechanism
for advancing mental health consumer interests, produces a curious
form of justice for persons with psychiatric disorders. From its unset-
tling relationship with rights giving (i.e., psychiatric citizens legitimiz-
ing the hegemony of the clinicolegal establishment) and rights taking
(i.e, psychiatric citizens experiencing civil/criminal confinement), to
its problematic association with ethical egoism (i.e., advocates/experts
presenting their own interests or incompletely re-presenting the
concerns of consumers) and measured altruism (i.e., advocates/experts
re-presenting the concerns of consumers consistent with the "good" of
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the advocacy specialist), mental health systems users are at least one
step removed from advancing their own justice-based sensibilities.
This conclusion may not appear problematic or troubling to most.
After all, persons with diagnosed mental disorders are defined as vari-
ably sick, diseased, and unable to speak on their own behalf. Thus it
follows that someone else, in particular a conscientious consumer
advocate/activist, most likely would be best positioned to represent
those psychiatric citizens who could not champion their own causes.
As a critical and philosophical matter, we contend that this state of
affairs, while certainly well-intended, remains deeply distressing.
If advocacy in mental health law is anchored by clinicolegal
interpretations of rights, illness, competency, and the like, and if con-
finement decisions hinge, fundamentally, on an appeal to established
structures of civil and criminal institutional authority, what room, if
any, is legitimately left for the disparate voices of persons with psychi-
atric disorders? Indeed, given these constructed realities, on whose
behalf is the advocacy truly initiated?. 6 Firmly lodged within these
questions is a concern for how (and why) the system of mental health
law substantially misses the mark with citizen justice and psychologi-
cal humanism."' This observation squarely returns us to the thesis
entertained in this Article; namely, providing a critically-inspired and
philosophically animated examination of the ethics of advocacy for
mental health systems users.
We recognize that human beings are vulnerable. As such, the
ethical standards that inform our everyday decision-making should
not be regarded as invincible or intractable. When too rigidly or
dogmatically imposed, they dismiss, sanitize, diminish, or otherwise
conceal the fragility of being human. If too artificially or abstractly
wedded to the ebb and flow of human conduct and social interaction,
ethical precepts eliminate the possibility that one may terrify another
by illuminating her or his vulnerability. This is precisely the prism we
206. Consider, for example, Warren's classic ethnographic study of civil commitment for
the mentally ill in the fictitiously named "Metropolitan Court" in California. During an admin-
istrative hearing, where a determination was made to extend or not involuntary confinement
beyond the initial 72 hour observational period, attorneys representing the interests of the
institutionalized, routinely forfeited their role as zealous client advocates and adopted a psychia-
trically-informed commonsense and consensual definition of mental illness. WARREN, supra
note 57, at 139-40. Further, as she concluded, "attorneys viewe[d] their clients as crazy and
therefore refraine[d] from standing firmly in the way of involuntary incarceration." Id. at 140.
207. There are both everyday and ideological explanations for the failure of the mental
health law system to attend adequately to the interests and needs of psychiatric consumers. In
substantial part, we have linked these explanations to police power and parens patriae concerns.
We submit that beyond these justifications is the legal and psychiatric community's investment
in paternalism. For a detailed assessment of paternalism in psychiatric justice, see ARRIGO, PSY-
CHIATRIC JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 139-74.
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all too frequently avoid. This light of innocence and uncertainty
exposes the flaws, the ironies, and the absurdities of being human.
This glow, however, is not cataclysmic. It is the light that makes
growth and discovery possible. It illuminates the road that may, if we
choose, lead us to another place, a better place, a more just and
humane place. We contend that identifying this juncture in the law-
psychology arena is sorely needed. It is especially important for those
ethical matters impacting society's approach to mental illness, confine-
ment and advocacy. Indeed, it may be the path that, one day, helps
restore dignity to all those who are or will be institutionalized.
